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Stockholder Politics
ROBERTO TALLARITA†
In the past few years, there has been a dramatic increase in shareholder support for proposals on political,
environmental, ethical, and social issues, from climate change and employee diversity to animal welfare
and corporate political spending (“social proposals”). But why do investors in a business corporation
concern themselves with socially relevant issues? And how should corporate and securities law address
this phenomenon?
Based on the analysis of more than 2,900 social proposals submitted from 2010 to 2021, this Article argues
that shareholder activism on socially relevant issues (“stockholder politics”) cannot be entirely explained
by financial motives or by special interest capture, as the traditional theories hold. Rather, stockholder
politics should be understood as a matchmaking enterprise in which a relatively small number of
specialized actors (“stockholder politics specialists”) connect shareholders with prosocial and expressive
motives on one side with corporate stakeholders, citizens, and social and policy activists on the other side.
Specialists “sell” information, monitoring, and voting opportunities to shareholders interested in socially
relevant issues, and they “sell” corporate voice externally to outside actors, including employees,
consumers, and citizens concerned about corporate externalities.
This complex phenomenon has both potential benefits and costs for corporate governance. On the one
hand, it constrains managerial discretion and reduces managerial agency problems on socially relevant
issues by monitoring corporate activities and eliciting shareholder preferences. On the other hand, it can
engulf corporate decision-making with multidimensional decisions with no clear equilibrium, and it can
exacerbate the agency problems of institutional investors.
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, ESG, shareholder proposals, corporate
democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Shareholders of large public companies make increasing use of federal
rules on shareholder proposals to submit and support resolutions on political,
environmental, ethical, and social issues. In the last few years, for example,
shareholders have asked Exxon Mobil to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions,1
Facebook to address its gender pay gap,2 and Bristol-Myers Squibb to stop its
experiments on animals.3
As this Article documents, from 2010 to 2021, companies included in the
S&P 500 received over 2,900 shareholder proposals on socially relevant issues,
including political spending and lobbying, climate change, recyclable
packaging, race and gender diversity, religious freedom, the use of pesticides,
child obesity, the excessive price of prescription drugs, sexual harassment, and
many other matters of public relevance. Throughout this Article, I refer to these
proposals as “social proposals.”
Crucially, as this Article shows, shareholder support for social proposals
has recently exploded. In 2010, social proposals obtained 18% of the votes on
average; in 2021, the number of votes had almost doubled to more than 35%.
From 2010 to 2019, only 1% of social proposals on average obtained a majority
at the annual meeting; in 2020 and 2021, 16% of social proposals did.
But why do investors in business corporations concern themselves with
socially relevant issues? And how should corporate and securities law address
this phenomenon?
These questions are especially timely. Environmental and social issues for
corporations and capital markets have recently taken center stage in the
academic and business discourse,4 and are now key elements of the Securities

1. Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2019 WL 1224513 (Apr. 2, 2019).
2. Facebook, Inc., 2019 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) at 65–67 (Apr. 12, 2019).
3. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2019 WL 7253981 (Mar. 1, 2019).
4. The recent literature on environmental and social issues in corporate governance is too vast to be
summarized here. Two strands of this literature are relevant for the issues discussed in this Article. The first
strand focuses on whether corporate leaders should be authorized to consider the interests of all corporate
stakeholders. See generally, e.g., Chris Brummer & Leo E. Strine Jr., Duty and Diversity, 75 VAND. L. REV. 1
(2022); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Purpose and Corporate Competition, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. 223 (2021); Emilie
Aguirre, Beyond Profit, 54 UC DAVIS L. REV. 2077 (2021); Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should
Corporations Have a Purpose?, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1309 (2021); Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation
Managed in 2020?: The Debate Over Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. LAW. 363 (2021); Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American
Economy. A Reply to Professor Rock, 76 BUS. LAW. 397 (2021); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Making Sense of the
Business Roundtable’s Reversal on Corporate Purpose, 46 J. CORP. L. 285 (2021); Stavros Gadinis & Amelia
Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (2020); Matteo Gatti & Chrystin D. Ondersma,
Can a Broader Corporate Purpose Redress Inequality? The Stakeholder Approach Chimera, 46 J. CORP. L. 102
(2020); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL
L. REV. 91 (2020). The second strand focuses on the role of investors in promoting social and environmental
goals. See generally, e.g., Roberto Tallarita, The Limits of Portfolio Primacy (Harvard L. Sch. Program on Corp.
Governance Working Paper, Paper No. 2022-7, 2022); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Stewardship (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst. Working Paper, Paper No. 566/2021, 2021); Amanda M. Rose, A Response to Calls for SECMandated ESG Disclosure, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1821 (2021); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, The SEC’s
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Exchange Commission’s (SEC) rulemaking agenda. At the end of 2020, under
the Trump Administration, the SEC adopted an amendment to the shareholder
proposal rules that makes the submission of shareholder proposals, including
social proposals, more difficult.5 In 2021 and 2022, under the Biden
Administration, the SEC has instead adopted a much more liberal approach in
allowing social proposals,6 and has proposed ambitious rules concerning the
disclosure of public companies’ climate risk7 and transparency in the use of
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices by investment
managers.8
Understanding shareholder activism on social proposals (a phenomenon I
will refer to as “stockholder politics”) and assessing its policy implications is,
therefore, an urgent task. This Article makes three main contributions to this
end. First, it presents a comprehensive empirical account of social proposals
based on a detailed examination of the 2,933 proposals submitted to S&P 500
companies from 2010 to 2021, including the analysis of over 17,000 pages of
documents from the decision record of the SEC. Second, it questions the
conventional explanations for this phenomenon and develops an alternative
framework in which stockholder politics is understood as a matchmaking
enterprise between shareholders with prosocial and expressive preferences and
extra-corporate actors in search of corporate voice. Third, it examines the policy
promise and perils of stockholder politics.
Shareholder Proposal Rule: Creating a Corporate Public Square, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1147 (2021);
Anna Christie, The Agency Costs of Sustainable Capitalism, 55 UC DAVIS L. REV. 875 (2021); Paul G. Mahoney
& Julia D. Mahoney, The New Separation of Ownership and Control: Institutional Investors and ESG,
2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 840 (2021); Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder
Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243
(2020); Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Exit vs. Voice (Harvard L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr.
Discussion Paper, Paper No. 1061, 2020); Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize
Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247 (2017) [hereinafter Hart & Zingales,
Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare].
5. Procedural Requirements & Resubmission Thresholds Under Exch. Act Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act
Release No. 89964, 2020 WL 5763382 (Sept. 23, 2020); see also Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm., Statement on Modernizing the Shareholder Proposal Framework for the Benefit of All Shareholders,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 24, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/24
/statement-by-chairman-clayton-on-modernizing-the-shareholder-proposal-framework-for-the-benefit-of-allshareholders/ (motivating Chairman Clayton’s support for the new rule); Caroline Crenshaw, Commissioner,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm., Statement on Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under Rule
14a-8, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 25, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09
/25/statement-by-commissioner-crenshaw-on-procedural-requirements-and-resubmission-thresholds-underrule-14a-8/ (explaining Commissioner Crenshaw’s dissent on the new rule). For a discussion of the effects on
the new rule on social proposals, see infra Part III.A.2.
6. See Shareholder Proposals: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM. (Nov. 3, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/staff-legal-bulletin-14l-shareholder-proposals [hereinafter SEC Staff Legal
Bulletin No. 14L].
7. The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, 87 Fed. Reg.
21334 (proposed Apr. 11, 2022) (to amend 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 229, 232, 239, 249).
8. Enhanced Disclosures by Certain Investment Advisers and Investment Companies About
Environmental, Social, and Governance Investment Practices, 87 Fed. Reg. 36654 (proposed June 17, 2022) (to
amend 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 230, 232, 239, 249, 274, 279).
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There are two conventional theories of social proposals.9 According to the
first theory, social proposals are driven by idiosyncratic preferences that differ
from those of most other shareholders. On this view, which I call “conflict
theory,” proponents of social proposals are either small individual investors who
want to voice their personal opinions on politics and society, or representatives
of “special interests,” such as labor unions and public pension funds. In either
case, stockholder politics is understood as a way to promote interests that
conflict with those of most “regular” shareholders.
According to the second theory, social proposals are instead based on
financial motivations, just like governance proposals and other more
conventional proposals. This theory, which I call “profit theory,” is premised on
the idea that improving the company’s social and environmental performance is
good for business. As recently put by BlackRock, “sustainability risk,
particularly climate risk, is investment risk,”10 meaning that companies (and,
therefore, investors) have a financial interest in reducing environmental risk.
This Article challenges both these conventional views. I argue that each of
these two theories does capture a partial truth, but neither adequately explains
important aspects of stockholder politics. As my empirical analysis shows,
contrary to the conflict theory, only a small number of social proposals are filed
by individual investors,11 and although many proposals are indeed filed by
representatives of “special interests,” these proposals have been receiving
increasing support from other shareholders.12 Furthermore, social proposals by
unions and public pension funds (considered by the supporters of the conflict
theory to be the typical examples of special interest proposals) obtain on average
more shareholder support than other social proposals.13
At the same time, contrary to the profit theory, many social proposals do
not seem to be driven by financial motives. Indeed, in the finance literature there
is mixed evidence on whether corporate social responsibility increases firm
value, and the data show that many social proposals do not mention a financial
rationale or do so in a vague or perfunctory way.14
To understand stockholder politics, we must take a different approach. We
must start from the recognition that shareholder preferences are the product of a
bundle of different motives—not only financial motives, but also prosocial and
expressive motives.15 Just like most individuals, in many circumstances
shareholders prefer a higher dollar payoff to a lower one (financial motive);
9. See infra Parts I.B, III.A, and III.B.
10. Jessica McDougall & Danielle Sugarman, Climate Risk and the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 2, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/03/02/climaterisk-and-the-transition-to-a-low-carbon-economy.
11. See infra Part III.A.1.
12. See infra Part III.A.2.
13. See infra Part III.A.2.
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. For a formal model of shareholders with prosocial preferences, see Hart & Zingales, Companies Should
Maximize Shareholder Welfare, supra note 4.
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however, they may be willing, to varying degrees, to accept a lower dollar payoff
in order to produce some benefits for others (prosocial motive), or in order to
express their political and moral values (expressive motive).16
At the same time, many economic and social players outside the corporate
organization aspire to influence the decisions of large public companies on
socially relevant issues. Large corporations wield significant power on
stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, consumers, and local communities,
as well as on the environment and society at large. Individuals and groups
affected by corporate decisions have an interest in monitoring and influencing
such decisions. Furthermore, activists, investors with prosocial and expressive
motives, and concerned citizens may be interested in shaping corporate social
impact.17
But while shareholders have the legal tools to monitor and influence
management’s socially relevant decisions, they lack the expertise and resources
to do so effectively. Symmetrically, outside actors that have expertise and
resources lack corporate voice: they cannot participate in corporate
deliberations.
My contention in this Article is that stockholder politics is a matchmaking
enterprise that connects these two groups. A relatively small number of repeat
players, which I will call “stockholder politics specialists,” perform a two-sided
role. On one side, specialists “sell” information and voting opportunities to
shareholders with prosocial and expressive motives. When a shareholder
proposal makes it to the ballot, shareholders have the opportunity to learn about
the relevant issue and express their preferences about it.
On the other side, specialists “sell” corporate voice to employees,
consumers, citizens concerned about corporate externalities, investors with
strong prosocial or expressive motives, and other extra-corporate actors.
Specialists offer these parties representation in the internal forum of the largest
corporations, with the aim of affecting the behavior of individual companies and,
more importantly, industry-level practices, regulation, and public policy
decisions.18
These two roles are closely connected. Shareholders with prosocial and
expressive motives find stockholder politics valuable because it provides them
with information and voting opportunities to monitor and influence management
decisions on issues they care about. Extra-corporate actors find stockholder
politics valuable because it gives them voice within the corporate organization,
so that they can try to affect business practices and public policy choices.
Stockholder politics specialists play the role of intermediaries by connecting
these two groups on matters of common concern. They are matchmakers in the
field of corporate social impact.

16. See infra Part IV.A.
17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. See infra Part IV.C.
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This framework illuminates some potential benefits of stockholder politics,
as well as some potential costs. On the benefit side, stockholder politics can be
a powerful tool to mitigate managerial agency problems on socially relevant
issues. As with purely financial decisions, corporate managers may make
socially relevant decisions that do not reflect the social and political preferences
of shareholders. But since most shareholders are apathetic or reticent, they do
not have sufficient incentives to monitor and correct the decisions made by
corporate managers.19 Stockholder politics mitigates this problem, as it provides
shareholders with information and voting opportunities on socially relevant
issues, and it facilitates the realignment of views between shareholders and
managers.20
On the cost side, however, expanding the scope of corporate deliberation
to include controversial social issues can lead to multidimensional decisions
with no clear equilibrium. Shareholders are much more likely to disagree on
social than on financial issues; therefore, aggregating their social and
environmental preferences can be an impossible task, which could engulf the
decision-making process with little or no gain for shareholder welfare.
Furthermore, since most voting power is in the hands of asset managers rather
than beneficial owners, and the social preferences of asset managers do not
necessarily reflect those of their clients, stockholder politics is likely to transfer
power from corporate managers to financial managers, rather than from
corporate managers to shareholders.21 Reasonable policy proposals to regulate
stockholder politics should consider both the potential benefits and costs of this
phenomenon, by strengthening its role as “check and balance” of managerial
power and limiting its potential distortions.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the anomaly
of social proposals and illustrates the two conventional explanations—the
conflict theory and the profit theory. Part II presents the dataset constructed for
this Article and provides an overview of social proposals from 2010 to 2021,
including the dramatic growth of shareholder support. Part III digs deeper in the
19. “Rational apathetic” and “rational reticent” have become terms of art in corporate governance
literature. “Rational apathetic” means that dispersed shareholders do not have sufficient incentives to acquire
information on corporate decisions and to act on that information. Rationally apathetic shareholders will remain
passive and uninterested in how the corporation is run. “Rationally reticent” means that shareholders are not
sufficiently motivated to take an active role but have enough incentive to react to the initiative of others. In the
case of shareholder proposals, rationally apathetic shareholders will neither submit a proposal nor vote on it
when others submit it; rationally reticent shareholders do not submit proposals but may react to proposals
submitted by activist shareholders. The first use of the expression “rational apathy” is found in Robert C. Clark,
Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 776, 779 (1979). Clark borrowed the concept from
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135, 147 (1957),
in which the concept of rational apathy is used to explain the decision of most citizens not to acquire political
information for the purpose of voting. The concept of rational reticence was introduced by Ronald J. Gilson &
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of
Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013).
20. See infra Part V.A.
21. See infra Part V.B.
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data and examines the partial insights and limitations of the conflict theory and
the profit theory. Part IV develops an alternative framework for understanding
stockholder politics as a matchmaking enterprise that connects shareholders with
prosocial and expressive preferences on one side and extra-corporate actors on
the other side. Part V examines the potential benefits and costs of stockholder
politics and its policy implications.
I. THE ANOMALY OF SOCIAL PROPOSALS
A. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND SOCIAL ISSUES
Rule 14a-8 provides that shareholder proposals that meet certain formal
and substantive conditions must be included in the proxy material that the
company distributes to shareholders.22 Shareholders of public companies are
geographically dispersed, and they rarely attend the company’s annual meeting
in person.23 Since they often vote by proxy, shareholders have no practical way
to learn about or vote on proposals that are not included in the company’s proxy
materials. Rule 14a-8 addresses this problem by obligating companies to make
proposals known to all shareholders and to allow them to express their vote on
these proposals.24
Most proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8 concern governance issues,
director compensation, director elections, takeover defenses, and other internal
organizational decisions.25 However, shareholders also make frequent use of
Rule 14a-8 to advance proposals that concern the interests of employees,
consumers, local residents, citizens, the environment, society at large, or even
non-human animals. These “social proposals” include not only big picture
problems such as climate change, corporate lobbying, and employee diversity,

22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
23. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
210 (2008) (“[M]ost shareholders will not attend the meeting in person. Instead, most shareholders vote by
proxy.”).
24. See Med. Comm. for Hum. Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 672 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated, 404 U.S.
403 (1972) (“It must be recognized that Management’s proxy statement is the only effective vehicle through
which all of the shareholders can have an opportunity to express themselves, and even to hear any arguments on
the questions involved.”) (quoting Hon. Benjamin Rosenthal in a speech in the U.S. House of Representatives,
116 Cong. Rec. E-2147 (daily ed., Mar. 17, 1970)).
25. In the period examined in this Article (2010–2021), 66.4% of the 10,291 shareholder proposals
recorded in the FactSet database for U.S. companies concern the following topics: supermajorities, board
declassification, executive compensation, vote requirements to elect directors, poison pills and other takeover
defenses, dual-class structures, size of the board, name change, requirements to call special meetings, by-laws
amendments, election of director nominees, removal of directors, say-on-pay, control transactions, separation of
chairman and CEO roles, establishment of corporate governance committees, sale or liquidation of the company,
term limits for directors, proxy contest expenses, requirements to act by written consent, independent directors,
mandatory retirement age for directors, director nominee qualifications, reincorporation in another U.S. state,
tax issues, dividends and buybacks, sale of assets, proxy access for director election, limiting the number of
boards on which directors may serve, removal of officers, stock splits, advisory agreements, and other issues
mostly related to corporate governance. All data have been collected from the FactSet shareholder proposal
database.
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but also a variety of narrower issues, such as smoke-free areas in the company’s
premises, energy efficiency in retail stores, the adverse effects of specific drugs,
the sale of weapons to foreign governments, the effect of bank overdraft policies
on low-income customers, employee ideological diversity, the use of cage-free
eggs, or the acceptance of censorship policies in foreign countries.
This phenomenon disproportionately affects the largest corporations. From
2010 to 2021, 85% of all social proposals recorded by FactSet were submitted
to companies included in the S&P 500, which comprises leading largecapitalization companies.26 By contrast, S&P 500 companies received only 59%
of the proposals on other topics.27
The apparent anomaly of social proposals is that they deal with the social
impact of corporate activities rather than with internal corporate affairs. The
traditional assumption in corporate finance is that shareholders are driven by
financial motives.28 While most shareholder proposals seem intuitively in line
with this assumption—for example, they want to curb excessive executive pay,
facilitate takeovers, or adopt more efficient corporate governance practices—
social proposals instead seem preoccupied with matters of public welfare, rather
than firm value.
Consider, for example, a proposal on food waste submitted to Amazon in
2019.29 The shareholder-proponent requested that Amazon “issue an annual
report . . . on the environmental and social impacts of food waste generated from
the company’s operations.”30 The proposal noted that “[d]espite one in seven
U.S. households struggling to afford regular, healthy meals, 40 percent of all
food produced in the U.S. is wasted,”31 and that this phenomenon generates
“devastating social and environmental consequences.”32 Although the proposed
resolution only requested a report on the food waste generated by Amazon—for
reasons that I will discuss in Part II.D—the supporting statement made clear that
the main goal of the proposal was to alleviate the social and environmental
impact of food waste.
Or consider a proposal on petrochemical plants submitted to DowDuPont
in 2019.33 The proponent explained that in case of severe weather events,
petrochemical facilities may release dangerous pollutants that can cause health
problems to local residents. The increase in frequency and intensity of storms
26. The S&P 500 “includes 500 leading companies and covers approximately 80% of available market
capitalization.”
S&P
500,
SPGLOBAL.COM,
https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/equity/sp500/#overview (last visited July 31, 2022).
27. FactSet reports a total of 3,457 “social and environmental” proposals and 6,834 other proposals
submitted to U.S. public companies, of which 2,933 (84.8%) and 4,057 (59.4%), respectively, were submitted
to U.S. companies included in the S&P 500.
28. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 15–16 (2006)
29. Amazon.com, Inc., 2019 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 15 (Apr. 11, 2019).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. DowDuPont, Inc., 2019 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 66 (Apr. 29, 2019).
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and hurricanes in the Gulf Coast, caused by climate change, is expected to cause
more such incidents in the future. Nonetheless, DowDuPont planned to build
new petrochemical facilities in the area. The proposal requested an assessment
of the “public-health risks”34 of these new investments and of “the adequacy of
the measures the company [was] employing to prevent public health impacts
from resultant chemical releases.”35
Another anomaly of these proposals is that they directly concern business
decisions, rather than organizational decisions. Conventional shareholder
proposals are about the “rules of the games”: how directors are chosen, how to
incentivize and discipline management, what powers investors should have, and
so forth. In fact, shareholder voice in public corporations is typically confined
to organizational decisions, whereas business decisions are the exclusive
jurisdiction of management.36 Such conventional governance arrangement is
consistent with shareholder incentives: for dispersed shareholders, acquiring and
processing the necessary information to discuss a specific business issue is
economically irrational.37 Contrary to this traditional paradigm, social proposals
often focus on specific business decisions: in the two examples above, the
location of DowDuPont’s industrial plants and Amazon’s grocery inventory
management.
Unsurprisingly, such anomalies have attracted significant attention from
scholars;38 these experts have failed, though, to reach a consensus on the causes
and policy implications of the phenomenon. In the next Subpart, I will discuss
the two dominant theories of social proposals.

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, What Is a
Corporation, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 11–13 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2017).
37. See supra note 19.
38. A rich legal literature on social proposals developed in the 1970s and 1980s, when the phenomenon
first emerged with some strength. See Donald E. Schwartz, The Socially Relevant Proxy Contest: Reflections on
Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1971); Donald E. Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals: CoExistence with Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 57 (1971) [hereinafter Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals]; Henry
G. Manne, Shareholder Social Proposals Viewed by an Opponent, 24 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1972); Donald E.
Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635 (1976);
Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV. 425 (1984); Patrick
J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97 (1988).
Other important analyses that are relevant for the issues discussed in this Article are found in Roberta Romano,
Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993)
[hereinafter Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism]; Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional
Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. REG. 174 (2001) [hereinafter
Romano, Less Is More]; Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO
ST. L.J. 53 (2008). For two excellent overviews of the shareholder proposal rule, see Jill E. Fisch, From
Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129 (1993), and Alan R. Palmiter,
The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879 (1994).
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B. CONFLICT THEORY AND PROFIT THEORY
The use of shareholder proposals to address socially relevant issues is as
old as the shareholder proposal rule itself. Right after the SEC adopted the first
shareholder proposal rule in 1942,39 the new device was immediately put to use
on matters of political and social relevance.40 Companies questioned this
practice, and the SEC initially sided with them, ruling that companies were
allowed to exclude proposals “submitted primarily for the purpose of promoting
general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.”41 But in
the 1970s, following a defeat in the D.C. Circuit42 and due to the increasing
social and political pressures on large corporations,43 the SEC amended the
proxy rules in order to allow the submission of proposals on public policy
issues.44 This regulatory change led, predictably, to an explosion of social
proposals. In 1972, shareholders filed only six social proposals; in 1976, the
number of social proposals was 322.45
Many prominent corporate law scholars took a critical view of this
phenomenon.46 The main argument presented by these critics was that
proponents of social proposals had idiosyncratic preferences that were radically
different from those of most other shareholders, as the very low support obtained
at annual meetings proved.47 In this view, socially relevant proponents are driven
either by frivolous motives (that is, the desire of small individual shareholders
to voice their personal views on society and politics, with little or no benefits for

39. Regulation X-14A, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942).
40. The first documented SEC decision on social proposals is from 1945, when a company challenged the
proposals of a shareholder concerning an assortment of policy issues, from the taxation of dividends to antitrust
law. The SEC Division of Corporate Finance concluded that those topics—and, more broadly, all general
political, social, and economic matters—were not, in fact, “a proper subject for action by security holders.”
Exchange Act Release No. 3638, 1945 WL 27415 (Jan. 3, 1945).
41. Exchange Act Release No. 4775, 1952 WL 5254 (Dec. 11, 1952). This amendment to the shareholder
proposal rule followed the case of Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). James Peck,
owner of three shares of common stock of Greyhound Corp., asked the company to include in the agenda for the
1951 annual meeting his proposal for the desegregation of the company’s seating system in the South.
Greyhound rejected the proposal, relying on the SEC decision of 1945, supra note 40, and the SEC staff
confirmed the company’s interpretation. Peck sought an injunction against Greyhound, but the court denied the
request on procedural grounds, without discussing the merits of the question.
42. Med. Comm. for Hum. Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403
(1971) (holding that shareholders should be able to keep managers accountable on matters of political and moral
significance).
43. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1517 (2007).
44. First, the SEC amended Rule 14a-8(c)(2) in order to allow social proposals, provided that they were
“significantly related to the business of the issuer” and “within the control of the issuer.” Exchange Act Release
No. 9784, 1972 WL 125400 (Sept. 22, 1972). Four years later, the SEC removed any references to “economic,
political, racial, religious, social or similar cause[s],” and clarified that a proposal could be “significantly related”
to the company’s business even if such a relation were not a purely economic one. Adoption of Amendments
Relating to Proposals by Sec. Holders, Release No. 12999, 1976 WL 160347 (Nov. 22, 1976).
45. Liebeler, supra note 38, at 431.
46. See, e.g., id.; Manne, supra note 38; Romano, Less Is More, supra note 38.
47. See infra Part III.A.2.
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the other shareholders),48 or by “special interests” (for example, proposals filed
by labor unions to advance employee interests or proposals advanced by
“highly-politicized” organizations to promote their own political agenda).49 In
both cases, according to this theory, social proposals serve particular interests
that are in conflict with the common interests of all shareholders. I will refer to
this theory as the “conflict theory” of social proposals.
An alternative theory, which dates back to the 1970s as well, but has
recently gained mainstream status,50 is that corporate social responsibility is a
way to increase profits and shareholder value. In this view—which I call the
“profit theory” of social proposals—social, ethical, and environmental goals are
only instrumental goals, whereas the ultimate goal remains shareholder value
maximization.51 The profit theory, embraced by many supporters of social
proposals,52 tries to reconcile the apparent anomaly of social proposals with the
traditional theory of corporate governance. On this account, social proposals are
oriented toward profit maximization, just like any other conventional corporate
strategy.
These two theories—conflict theory and profit theory—have very different
normative implications. The main implication of the conflict theory is that social
proposals do not serve the interests of shareholders and should therefore be
limited or prohibited. The implication of the profit theory is that social proposals
are no less compatible with shareholder value than other kinds of proposals and
therefore pose no special normative problem. In this Article, I argue that both
theories capture a partial truth but neither adequately explains some important
aspect of the phenomenon.
To shed light on stockholder politics, I conducted a comprehensive
empirical analysis of all social proposals presented by shareholders to a
company included in the S&P 500,53 from January 2010 through December
2019. In Part II, I describe the dataset and the main characteristics of the
phenomenon.

48. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & James E. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium:
Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 370 (2007) (“Academic
research has generally concluded that corporate governance proposals raise important substantive issues, while
the social responsibility proposals are frequently viewed as frivolous.”).
49. See, e.g., Romano, Less Is More, supra note 38, at 231–32.
50. The study of the link between “corporate social responsibility” and financial performance dates back
to the 1970s, but the “profit case” for corporate social responsibility has become mainstream over the last twenty
years. For a brief overview of this intellectual history, see Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate
Governance Machine, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 2563, 2612–15 (2021).
51. See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial
Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 648 (2016) (presenting the “business case for risk-related activism,” which includes
the use of nonfinancial factors); Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND.
L. REV. 1402 (2020) (arguing that social and environmental concerns are important to mitigate downside risk
for investors).
52. See infra Part III.B.
53. A company qualifies for inclusion in the sample if it was a constituent company of the S&P 500 at the
time of the relevant annual meeting.
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C. STOCKHOLDER POLITICS
Throughout this Article, I refer to the use of social proposals as
“stockholder politics.” This shorthand is used mainly for brevity, but it also
captures some important results of my analysis. To begin with, these proposals
concern the welfare of society at large, rather than the internal affairs of the
company. In this regard, the term “politics” is used in its broadest and noblest
sense, meaning the activity aimed at the good of the entire community.54 I am
agnostic on the question whether these proposals actually improve social
welfare. What is clear is that, unlike conventional shareholder proposals, which
focus on corporate governance issues, these proposals explicitly tackle political
and social issues. “Politics,” in this context, refers to this general-welfare
dimension of the phenomenon.
Furthermore, the main goal of the proponents of social proposals is, as I
will show, the practical advancement of policy objectives. Many of the main
players are interested not only in company-level decisions, but also in market
and social change. In this sense, “politics” is used in one of its most common
meanings, which is the use of power (in our case, shareholder power) to
influence public decisions.55 As I will discuss at length in Part IV.C, many
proponents of social proposals are not shareholders who happen to hold and
voice public policy views, but public policy players who happen to be (or to
partner with) shareholders.
Finally, shareholder proposals are an inherently political tool used to
discipline managerial decisions. In fact, unlike market-based mechanisms, such
as investment or divestment decisions or takeovers, shareholder proposals rely
on mechanisms similar to those used by citizens in a democracy, such as voting,
ballot proposals, and campaigns in support of specific issues.56 This political
metaphor, I believe, will help us see what is valuable and what is problematic
with social proposals.
II. SOCIAL PROPOSALS
This Part provides an overview of social proposals, based on the empirical
analysis of more than 2,900 proposals submitted over the past twelve years.
Subpart A explains the construction of the dataset. Subparts B through E discuss
the companies, industries, topics, proposed resolutions, and outcome of social
proposals.

54. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 54 (1981).
55. See, e.g., ANDREW HEYWOOD, POLITICS 9–12 (2013).
56. On the distinction between market-based models and political models of corporate governance, see
generally John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control,
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1993).
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A. DATASET
To construct my dataset, I relied on the shareholder proposals on social and
environmental issues reported by FactSet for the period from 2010 to 2021 at
companies included in the S&P 500, and I manually excluded those few
proposals that were erroneously categorized as social or environmental
proposals. The final sample contains 2,933 proposals. I collected data from
FactSet regarding the companies, meeting dates, name of the proponent, text of
the proposed resolution, outcome of the vote, management response, and market
capitalization at the time of the shareholder meeting.
Then, for each proposal, I reviewed and hand-coded the text of the
proposed resolution, and I collected information on the proponents from news
sources and corporate websites. For a subsample of 300 recent proposals for
which the company sought a no-action letter from the SEC, from 2017 to 2019
(the “SEC Record Subsample”), I reviewed the entire SEC decision record, for
a total of 17,297 pages of legal documents, correspondence, and other
documentation. Throughout this Article, I will report and discuss the findings of
my empirical analysis to examine various critical aspects of this phenomenon.
In the following Subparts, I will present a general overview of the main
characteristics of this phenomenon.
B. COMPANIES AND INDUSTRIES
Hundreds of large public companies receive shareholder proposals on
social issues. In my sample, a total of 399 companies received at least one social
proposal over the relevant period. However, not all companies receive the same
level of attention on socially relevant matters. Many companies received only a
few proposals in total, while some companies received several proposals every
year.
Table 1 reports the number of proposals received by the most frequently
targeted twenty companies, as well as the distribution of proposals across target
companies by quartile group. The data show that the distribution is highly
unequal. The companies in the top quartile group account for over 70% of all
proposals, while the companies in the bottom quartile group account for less
than 8% of the proposals.
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TABLE 1: MOST FREQUENT TARGETS OF SOCIAL PROPOSALS
Company

Proposals

% of Sample

Exxon Mobil
Amazon.com

93
69

3.2%
2.4%

Chevron

69

2.4%

Dominion Energy
Walmart

49
47

1.7%
1.6%

JPMorgan Chase
McDonald’s
Pfizer

45
42
41

1.5%
1.4%
1.4%

AT&T
Alphabet
The Home Depot
Verizon Communications

38
38
37
36

1.3%
1.3%
1.3%
1.2%

ConocoPhillips

32

1.1%

General Electric
Johnson & Johnson
Apple

31
31
30

1.1%
1.1%
1.0%

Bank of America
FedEx
PepsiCo

30
30
30

1.1%
1.0%
1.0%

The Kroger Co.

29

1.0%

4th Quartile Group
3rd Quartile Group

2049
523

69.9%
17.8%

2nd Quartile Group
1st Quartile Group

132
229

4.5%
7.8%

Distribution of Proposals

The company that received the largest number of proposals is Exxon
Mobil, which received more than three times the number of proposals of the
twentieth most frequent target, The Kroger Co. In the aggregate, the twenty
companies with the largest number of proposals (representing 5% of all the
companies in the sample) account for 28.9% of the entire sample.
Social proposals are unequally distributed across industries, as well. The
companies in the sample span forty-two of the forty-eight industries in the FamaFrench industry classification.57 However, the six most frequently targeted
57. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Industry Costs of Equity, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 153 (1997).
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industries (Retail, Oil & Gas, Utilities, Banks, Business Services, and
Pharmaceutical) account for more than half (51.2%) of all the proposals, while
the six least frequently targeted industries (Recreation, Shipping Containers,
Electrical Equipment, Real Estate, Beer & Liquor, and Textiles) account for less
than 0.4% of the sample. Table 2: Industries with Most Social Proposals reports
the number of proposals for the twenty industries with the most proposals, which
account, in the aggregate, for 91.8% of the sample.
TABLE 2: INDUSTRIES WITH MOST SOCIAL PROPOSALS
Industry

Proposals

% of Sample

Retail
Oil & Gas
Utilities
Banks
Business Services

364
358
274
188
159

12.4%
12.2%
9.3%
6.4%
5.4%

Pharma
Communications
Transportation
Finance

159
147
125
123

5.4%
5.0%
4.3%
4.2%

Insurance
Meals
Electronic Equipment

121
114
90

4.1%
3.9%
3.1%

Food
Aircraft

88
85

3.0%
2.9%

Candy & Soda
Computers
Tobacco
Chemicals
Machinery
Medical Equipment

53
59
50
49
43
37

2.2%
2.0%
1.7%
1.7%
1.5%
1.3%

2132
597
164
40

72.7%
20.4%
5.6%
1.4%

Distribution of Proposals
4th Quartile Group
3rd Quartile Group
2nd Quartile Group
1st Quartile Group

C. TOPICS
Social proposals focus on a variety of topics. Based on the text of the
proposed resolutions, I divided all 2,933 proposals into four categories—
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political activity, environmental issues, social issues, and generic environmental
and social (E&S) issues—and forty-eight subcategories. Table 3 reports the
number of proposals for each category and the most frequent subcategories.
TABLE 3: SOCIALLY RELEVANT TOPICS
Issues

Proposals

% of Sample

440
373

15.0%
12.7%

87

3.0%

Environmental Issues
Climate Change
Sustainability Report
Lobbying & Advocacy
Waste

335
83
81
61

11.4%
2.8%
2.8%
2.1%

Renewable Energies
Toxic Products
Nuclear Power

50
37
28

1.7%
1.3%
1.0%

Other Environ. Issues

146

5.0%

367
223

12.5%
7.6%

78
77
75

2.7%
2.6%
2.6%

55
38
29
238
30

1.9%
1.3%
1.0%
8.1%
1.0%

Political Activity
Political Spending
Lobbying
Other Political Issues

Social Issues
Sex, Gender, and Race
Human Rights
Public Health
Animal Welfare
Employee Rights
Economic Inequality
Charitable Contributions
Israel-Palestine Conflict
Other Social Issues
E&S General Issues

As the Table shows, more than half (51.6%) of all proposals concern
political spending; lobbying; climate change; or sex, gender, and race issues.
Proposals on political spending and lobbying typically call for more
transparency on the donations and expenditures made by the company to support
political candidates, influence elections or ballot proposals, lobby elected
officials, or support trade associations or other organizations that promote policy
or political causes.58 A smaller number of political proposals require disclosure
58. A typical example of political spending proposal is the following resolution submitted in 2019 by the
Unitarian Universalist Association to ExxonMobil Corporation:
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of policy advocacy activities, assessments of the consistency of political activity
with stated corporate values, risks connected with politically sensitive activities,
and other issues related to the company’s political activities.59
Proposals on sex, gender, and race focus on several different issues.
Typical examples are proposals requiring disclosure of employee race and
gender diversity,60 or proposals pushing for the appointment of more women and
members of underrepresented minorities on the board of directors,61 addressing
the gender pay gap,62 or asking for a corporate policy on racial discrimination.63

The shareholders of Exxon Mobil Corporation (‘Exxon’ or ‘Company’) hereby request that the
Company prepare and semiannually update a report, which shall be presented to the pertinent board
of directors committee and posted on the Company’s website, that discloses the Company’s: (a)
Policies and procedures for making electoral contributions and expenditures with corporate funds
(both direct and indirect), including the board’s role (if any) in that process; and (b) Monetary and
non-monetary contributions or expenditures that could not be deducted as an ‘ordinary and
necessary’ business expense under section 162(e)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code, including (but
not limited to) contributions or expenditures on behalf of candidates, parties, and committees and
entities organized and operating under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, as well as the
portion of any dues or payments made to any tax-exempt organization (such as a trade association)
used for an expenditure or contribution that, if made directly by the Company, would not be
deductible under section 162(e)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code.
ExxonMobil Corp., 2019 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 66 (Apr. 11, 2019). A typical example of a lobbying
proposal is the following resolution submitted in 2019 by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters to FedEx
Corp.:
Resolved, the stockholders of FedEx request the preparation of a report, updated annually, disclosing:
1. Company policy and procedures governing lobbying, both direct and indirect, and grassroots
lobbying communications. 2. Payments by FedEx used for (a) direct or indirect lobbying or (b)
grassroots lobbying communications, in each case including the amount of the payment and the
recipient. 3. FedEx’s membership in and payments to any tax-exempt organization that writes and
endorses model legislation. 4. Description of management’s and the Board’s decision-making
process and oversight for making payments described in section 2 and 3 above.
FedEx Corp., 2019 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 99 (Aug. 12, 2019).
59. For example, a proposal submitted in 2017 to Caterpillar, Inc. requested that the company report “on
the process for identifying and prioritizing legislative and regulatory public policy advocacy activities” and
explain “the business rationale for prioritization.” Caterpillar, Inc., 2017 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 63 (Apr.
26, 2017). Another example is a proposal submitted in 2016 to CVS Health Corp., which requested a
“congruency analysis between corporate values as defined by CVS’s stated policies . . . and [the company and
the company’s PAC] political and electioneering contributions.” CVS Health Corp. 2016 Proxy Statement (Form
14A) 64 (Apr. 8, 2016).
60. See, e.g., The Home Depot, Inc., 2019 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 25 (Apr. 8, 2019) (requesting a
“chart identifying employees according to their gender and race in each of the nine major EEOC-defined job
categories” and information on the company policies and actions to “increas[e] diversity in the workplace”).
61. See, e.g., Discovery, Inc., 2015 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 95 (Apr. 3, 2015) (requesting a report
“on plans to increase diverse representation on the Board as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of these
efforts”).
62. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 2019 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 60 (Oct. 16, 2019) (requesting a report
“on the company’s global median gender pay gap, including associated policy, reputational, competitive, and
operational risks, and risks related to recruiting and retaining female talent”).
63. See, e.g., Amazon, Inc., 2017 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 16-17 (Apr. 12, 2017) (requesting an
evaluation of “the risk of racial discrimination that may result from the use of criminal background checks in
hiring and employment decisions”).
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However, many proposals focus on narrower topics, including very
specific questions, such as the use of tobacco by young customers,64 healthbased employee discrimination,65 the risks posed by facial recognition
technology,66 or the sale of weapons to foreign governments.67
D. EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT REQUESTS
Shareholder proposals cannot be longer than 500 words.68 Within this
maximum length, proponents typically include the text of a resolution, which is
the proposed action that the proponents request or recommend, and a supporting
statement, which illustrates the factual premises and arguments supporting the
proposal.
It is important to note that shareholder proposals are generally not
binding.69 It is commonly understood that state corporate law does not allow
shareholders to make binding corporate decisions, except when these decisions
concern the election of directors, amendments to the company’s charter and bylaws, mergers, and other major organizational issues.70 Therefore, in almost all
cases, shareholder-proponents present their proposals in the form of
recommendations to management (so-called “precatory proposals”) rather than
binding resolutions. Only twenty-two proposals in my sample (0.7%) are
binding.
Furthermore, shareholder proposals tend to avoid being overly specific
about the corporate actions that they recommend. In particular, most proposals
do not request or recommend that the company adopt a specific policy (for
example, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions below a certain level), but
rather request disclosure of some information or a report describing the
company’s plans with respect to a certain issue (for example, a report describing
how the company plans to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions). This is due to

64. See, e.g., Altria Group, Inc., 2011 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 75 (Apr. 8, 2011) (requesting that
“Altria stops the production of any of its tobacco products with characterizing flavoring added, as well as their
distribution and their marketing, unless and until it can be proven by independent and evidence-based research
that such added characterizing flavors do not contribute significantly to youth initiation of tobacco use”).
65. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 2011 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 64-65 (Mar. 16, 2011)
(requesting the company to “amend its Equal Employment Opportunity Policy to explicitly include the
prohibition of discrimination based on the health status of an applicant”).
66. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc., 2019 Proxy Statement, supra note 29 (requesting that the board of
directors “prohibit sales of facial recognition technology to government agencies unless the Board concludes,
after an evaluation using independent evidence, that the technology does not cause or contribute to actual or
potential violations of civil and human rights”).
67. See, e.g., ITT Corp., 2010 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 15–16 (Mar. 29, 2010) (requesting a report “of
ITT Industries’ foreign sales of military and weapons-related products and services”).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (2021).
69. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 38, at 101 (mentioning the “consensus understanding” that the “typical rule
14a–8 proposal is . . . advisory or precatory in nature”).
70. See generally Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 130
(2009) (“Shareholders have binding votes on only two things: the election of directors and ratifying fundamental
corporate changes such as mergers.”).
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the regulatory constraints on “micromanagement,” which prevent shareholderproponents from phrasing their proposal in an “overly prescriptive” manner.71
Despite these formal constraints, the substantive goal of social proposals is
not only to elicit information about a particular issue, but also to change the way
the company operates with respect to that issue. This goal may be accomplished
through two different channels. First, disclosure of what the company presently
does might create internal and external pressure toward changing the company’s
behavior in the future.72 Second, proposals formally asking for disclosure or for
the study of a given problem often indicate, in an indirect or informal manner,
what the correct policy goal should be or even what specific actions the company
should take to achieve such a goal. In this way, proposals aim to convey
shareholders’ substantive preferences to management.
To understand this second aspect, it is useful to distinguish between the
explicit request contained in a shareholder proposal and the implicit request that
can be inferred from the entirety of the text. For example, a proposal submitted
to Target Corp. in 2011 requested that “the board of directors prepare a
report . . . on policy options, above and beyond legal compliance, to minimize
the environmental impacts of its electronic recycling activities.”73 While the
explicit request contained in the proposal was limited to the preparation of a
report, the language used in the resolution made clear that the ultimate goal of
the proponent was to improve the company’s recycling programs and to reduce
the environmental impact of electronic waste. In fact, the proposal included
some specific actions, such as “providing mechanisms for [the] take back of all
electronics sold”74 or “preventing export to non-OECD countries of hazardous
e-waste,”75 which were presented as mere examples of what the report could
discuss but were clearly meant to provide concrete suggestions about specific
policies to implement.
To illustrate this aspect, I analyzed the language of a random subsample of
100 proposals. The vast majority of explicit requests are either for the

71. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 16, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/staff-legal-bulletin-14k-shareholder-proposals (“Notwithstanding the precatory
nature of a proposal, if the method or strategy for implementing the action requested by the proposal is overly
prescriptive, thereby potentially limiting the judgment and discretion of the board and management, the proposal
may be viewed as micromanaging the company.”). But see SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L, supra note 6
(rescinding the Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14K and suggesting that social proposals will be allowed if they focus
on socially significant issues, regardless of the business connection with the company, and that the
micromanagement exception will be applied more favorably to the shareholder-proponent). Note however, that
the Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L was adopted in November 2021 and does not affect the sample analyzed in this
Article.
72. See, e.g., David W. Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10773, 10775 (2001) (“[E]ven in the absence of more traditional regulatory controls, postdisclosure pressures brought to bear by [the social institutions of market and public opinion] will create market
incentives positively affecting the attitudes of regulated entities toward environmental performance.”).
73. Target Corp., 2011 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 64 (Apr. 28, 2011).
74. Id. at 65.
75. Id. at 64.
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preparation of a report (69%) or the creation of a committee to study the
particular issue (6%). Only a quarter of the resolutions explicitly request that the
company adopt a policy. For example, a proposal submitted to Wells Fargo in
2017 asked the board “to develop and adopt a global policy regarding the rights
of indigenous people . . . which includes respect for the free, prior and informed
consent of indigenous communities affected by [the company’s] financing.”76
Another example is a proposal submitted to Reynolds American in 2015, which
asked the board “to create a policy that all its suppliers throughout its tobacco
procurement supply chain verify (with independent monitoring) their
commitment and compliance regarding non-employment . . . of laborers who
have had to pay to cross the U.S. border.”77
However, regardless of their explicit request, 50% of the proposals in the
subsample contain an implicit request to pursue certain policy goals or even to
implement specific concrete actions. In sum, approximately half of the proposals
in the subsample indicate, whether explicitly or implicitly, the policy goals or
the specific actions that the company should pursue. Table 4 reports the results
of this analysis.
TABLE 4: PROPOSED RESOLUTIONS
Neutral
Policy

Implicit Request
Policy
Specific
Goals
Action

None

Total

46.4%
16.7%
8.0%
35.0%

26.1%
66.7%
40.0%
32.0%

20.3%
16.7%
0.0%
15.0%

69.0%
6.0%
25.0%

Explicit
Request
Report
Committee
Policy
Total

E.

7.3%
0.0%
52.0%
18.0%

OUTCOME

Not all social proposals go to a vote. I found that 18% of the proposals in
my sample were withdrawn by the proponents at some point during the process.
From the analysis of the correspondence between proponents and management
(for the proposals included in the SEC Record Subsample), it appears that a
withdrawal almost always follows a company’s commitment or, at the very least,
an informal indication that the company’s management is willing to engage in
an ongoing conversation with the proponent.
Furthermore, 19% of the proposals are successfully excluded by the
company. Under Rule 14a-8, companies may exclude a shareholder proposal

76. Wells Fargo & Co., 2017 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 96 (Mar. 15, 2017).
77. Reynolds America, Inc., 2015 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 99 (Mar. 20, 2015).
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from the proxy statement if the proposal does not meet certain criteria.78 The
standard process is that the company must file a request for a no-action letter
with the SEC, presenting its reasons for excluding the proposals. The proponent
may then respond to the no-action request, and the SEC’s staff subsequently
decides whether it agrees with the company.79 In my sample, in 39% of the cases
management tries to exclude the proposal from the proxy statement by seeking
a no-action letter from the SEC, and it succeeds approximately half of the times
(49.5% of no-action requests are granted by the SEC).
When the proposal makes it to the ballot (about 65% of all the proposals in
the sample), management virtually always recommends that shareholders vote
against these proposals. Of the 1,902 proposals in the sample that were included
in the proxy statement, management took no explicit position (neither in favor
nor against) on three proposals and recommended to vote in favor of four
proposals. For all the remaining 1,895 proposals, management encouraged
shareholders to vote against them.
Remarkably, only a very small fraction of the proposals that go to a vote
are approved by shareholders. Of the 1,851 proposals in the sample on which
shareholders voted, only 61 (3.3%) obtained the required majority. All the other
1,596 proposals did not pass.
***
The data discussed in this Part confirm the two anomalies commonly
associated with social proposals. These proposals focus on matters of public
welfare or on extra-corporate interests, and they often address specific strategic
or business decisions, rather than organizational issues. In Part III, I will
examine the two conventional explanations for these anomalies (conflict theory
and profit theory), their insights, and their limitations.
III. THE LIMITS OF THE CONVENTIONAL THEORIES

In this Part, I will examine the two conventional theories of stockholder
politics—the conflict theory and the profit theory—and I will discuss their
insights and limitations. Each of these two theories, I contend, captures a partial
truth, but neither adequately explains important aspects of stockholder politics.
Contrary to the conflict theory, only a small number of social proposals are filed
by individual investors, and even if many proposals are indeed filed by
representatives of “special interests,” these proposals have been receiving
78. A proposal can be excluded for failure to meet a procedural requirement, if the procedural deficiency
has not been remedied following the process set forth in Rule 14a-8(f), or for one of the substantive exclusion
criteria set forth in Rule 14a-8(i). 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2021).
79. Id. Technically, SEC no-action letters do not contain a binding decision of the SEC but only the
“informal views” of the staff. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, 2001 WL 34886112 (July 13, 2001), § 11.
However, despite their informal nature, SEC no-action letters have become the main source of jurisprudence on
Rule 14a-8, and courts take them into consideration even if they do not automatically defer to them. See, e.g.,
Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 332 (3d Cir. 2015); Tosdal v. Nw. Corp., 440 F. Supp.
3d 1186, 1194 (D. Mont. 2020).
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increasing shareholder support over the past few years. At the same time,
contrary to the profit theory, many social proposals do not seem driven by
financial motives and use financial motivations in a perfunctory way.
A. CONFLICT THEORY
As discussed in Part I.B, the conflict theory, which is mostly embraced by
critics of stockholder politics, posits that proponents of social proposals have
idiosyncratic preferences that are radically different from those of most other
shareholders. On this view, proponents of social proposals are driven either by
frivolous motives (that is, the desire of small individual shareholders to voice
their personal views on society and politics, with little or no benefits for the other
shareholders) or by “special interests” (for example, proposals filed by labor
unions to advance employee interests at the expense of shareholders or proposals
advanced by “highly-politicized” organizations to promote their own political
agendas).
The normative implications of the conflict theory are clear. Since the
review, printing, and distribution of proposals to shareholders is costly,80 and
since examining these proposals and voting on them uses up time that would
otherwise be devoted to other matters, proposals that are systematically
misaligned with the preferences and goals of shareholders are an inefficient use
of shareholders’ time and resources and should be restricted or prohibited.81
To assess the validity of this theory, I examined the identity of the
proponents for all the 2,933 proposals in the sample and the level of shareholder
support received by proposals submitted by each category of proponents. My
findings show that the conflict theory highlights some accurate aspects of social
proposals, but it overstates their significance and ultimately does not adequately
explain the phenomenon. I will examine these aspects in the following Subparts.
1. The “Gadfly” Critique
Some critics of stockholder politics believe that many social proposals are
“motivated more by narcissism than by any heartfelt concern about . . . social
responsibility.”82 According to this view, these proposals are driven by frivolous
or idiosyncratic preferences of individual shareholders, who obtain some
personal utility from this form of small-scale activism but create little or no value
for the other shareholders.83 These “independent public stockholders” or, more
colloquially, “corporate gadflies” have often been criticized for wasting
shareholder resources on personal crusades.84
80. See infra Part V.A.
81. See, e.g., Liebeler, supra note 38, at 439.
82. Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1215 (2002).
83. See Thomas & Cotter, supra note 48, at 370.
84. “Independent public stockholder” is the term used by Lewis Gilbert, one of the first individual
shareholder activists, in a 1950 article. Lewis D. Gilbert, Management and the Public Stockholder, 28 HARV.
BUS. REV. 73 (July 1950). Gilbert, together with his brother, was responsible for a significant fraction of
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Indeed, if we measure how valuable a proposal is for shareholders by the
percentage of votes in favor that the proposal receives (hereinafter, “shareholder
support”),85 proposals submitted by individuals create less value than proposals
submitted by institutional actors, even after controlling for size and industry of
the company, year, and topic of the proposal.
Table 5 reports results of regressions where the outcome variable is the
average shareholder support, and the independent variable is an indicator
variable for whether the proposal was submitted by an individual shareholder or
by an institutional shareholder. The proposals examined are all the proposals in
the sample that went to a vote, with the exclusion of the proposals for which
FactSet does not report the name of the proponent, for a total of 1,603 proposals.
Column (1) reports the regression coefficient without any control variables. The
result indicates that proposals submitted by individual shareholders obtained an
average shareholder support that is 6.12 percentage points lower than the support
received by proposals submitted by institutional shareholders. Column (2)
estimates the coefficient after controlling for market capitalization, industry,
year of the annual meeting, and topic of the proposal.86 The result indicates that
proposals submitted by individual shareholders obtained an average shareholder
support that is 4.83 percentage points lower than the support received by
proposals submitted by institutional shareholders. In both models, the results are
statistically significant (p < 0.001).

shareholder proposals submitted in the early years of shareholder activism. For example, a survey of shareholder
proposals submitted between 1948 and 1951 found that Lewis and John Gilbert were the authors of 47% of all
the proposals. Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, The SEC Proxy Proposal Rule: The Corporate Gadfly,
19 U. CHI. L. REV. 807, 830 (1952). For a discussion of this phenomenon, see, for example, Martin Lipton &
Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 187, 231–32 (1991) (proposing the abolition of Rule 14-8 proposals, on the grounds that it is used
only by gadflies who do not promote the interests of shareholders); Morgan N. Neuwirth, Shareholder
Franchise—No Compromise: Why the Delaware Courts Must Proscribe All Managerial Interference with
Corporate Voting, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 423, 428 (1996) (characterizing the use of the proxy rules by gadflies as
aimed at gaining publicity); Marleen A. O’Connor, Organized Labor as Shareholder Activist: Building
Coalitions to Promote Worker Capitalism, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1345, 1361 (1997) (reporting the view that
“social proposals involv[e] emotional issues [and are] brought by “gadflies” and “crazies” seeking publicity for
quixotic causes”); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for
Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 301 (2003) (suggesting that “shareholder gadflies may reap
personal value from the attention associated with the sponsorship of proxy proposals”).
85. I measure shareholder support as the percentage of votes in favor out of the total votes in favor and
against. Therefore, “abstain” votes are not counted in the numerator or the denominator.
86. Market capitalization is adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index released by the U.S.
Labor Department’s Bureau of Labor Statistics. Industry is one of the twelve Fama-French industries,
determined on the basis of the companies’ SIC code. Topic of the proposal is one of the twenty-one main subcategories reported in Table 3.
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TABLE 5: SHAREHOLDER SUPPORT FOR INDIVIDUAL PROPOSALS
Average Shareholder Support
(1)
(2)
Individual Proponent

Market Cap
Topic
Industry
Year
Observations

-6.12***
(1.02)

-4.83***
(0.89)

NO
NO
NO
NO
1,603

YES
YES
YES
YES
1,601

However, the data also show that proposals by individual shareholders are
a marginal phenomenon. Unlike corporate governance proposals, a significant
fraction of which are submitted by “gadflies,”87 the vast majority of social
proposals are submitted by institutional actors. Table 6 reports data on the type
of proponents for 2,680 social proposals in my sample.88 As the table shows,
individual proponents account for less than a quarter of the total proposals.
TABLE 6: TYPES OF PROPONENTS
Type of Proponent
Individuals
Socially Responsible Inv. Manag.
Public Pension Funds
Religious Orgs
Policy and Social Orgs
Labor Orgs
Charities and Foundations
Other

Proposals
21.8%
20.4%
16.4%
14.4%
12.8%
7.6%
4.5%
2.0%

Furthermore, my analysis of the SEC decision record reveals that many
individual proponents are not the actual authors and promoters of the proposals
they formally submit. In many cases, individual shareholders serve as mere
“nominal proponents” for other organizations—typically, shareholder advocates
or other institutional actors—who file and promote the proposals on behalf of
the individual proponents. Based on my review of the documentation filed with
87. See generally Nickolay Gantchev & Mariassunta Giannetti, The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder
Democracy: Gadflies and Low-Cost Activism, 34 REV. FIN. STUD. 5629 (2021); Yaron Nili & Kobi Kastiel, The
Giant Shadow of Corporate Gadflies, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. 569, 573 (2021) (finding that in 2018, five individual
shareholders filed 40% of all shareholder proposals at S&P 1500 companies).
88. I excluded 253 proposals for which FactSet does not report the name of the proponent. To establish the
category of proponent, I collected information from corporate websites, news sites, and personal and professional
websites.
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the SEC in relation to the proposals in the SEC Record Subsample, I estimate
that more than half of the individual proposals (52.7%) are in fact submitted
(and, arguably, conceived and prepared) by institutional actors that specialize in
stockholder politics.89
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that social proposals filed by retail
shareholders independently (that is, without the professional support of
shareholder advocates, socially responsible investment managers, or other
activists in social proposals) comprise approximately 10% of the total social
proposals filed.90 Thus, contrary to the “gadfly” critique, proposals by “gadflies”
or other individuals acting independently are a very small fraction of social
proposals and an insignificant part of the overall phenomenon.
2. The “Special Interests” Critique
Another critique of social proposals is that many of these proposals are
driven by “special interests,” that is, by organizations protecting outside groups
and outside interests, such as workers, consumers, minorities, the environment,
or non-human animals. According to this view, stockholder politics aims at
narrow goals that are not necessarily aligned, and often conflict, with the
interests of the company and its shareholders.
Indeed, as shown in Table 6, a substantial number of social proposals are
submitted by organizations that have the institutional purpose of protecting the
interests of their constituents (such as unions and other labor organizations,
which are responsible for 8.8% of all proposals),91 promoting the social and
moral values of a religious group (such as the various confessional
organizations, which are responsible in the aggregate for 14.8% of all proposals),
pursuing philanthropic goals (such as charitable organizations and foundations,
which are responsible for 4% of all proposals), or advocating social and policy
changes for the protections of specific interests (such as environmental activists,
animal welfare organizations, and other social and policy organizations).
If we adopt a broad interpretation of “special interests,” including all
organizations whose main purpose is the pursuit of extra-corporate objectives,
special interest proponents submitted 39.3% of all proposals in my sample. If
we expand this category further to include public pension funds, which are often
89. See infra Part IV.C.
90. It is plausible that the percentage of individual proponents assisted by advocates or other institutional
actors is smaller in the SEC Record Subsample than in the whole sample. Indeed, the SEC Record Subsample
comprises of proposals for which the company has sought a no-action letter request, and therefore low-quality
proposals (i.e., proposals lacking formalities or failing to meet regulatory conditions) might well be overrepresented in the SEC Record Subsample. If this were true, and assuming that independent individual proposals
are likely to be less sophisticated than proposals prepared by professional activists, the percentage of independent
individual proposals in the whole sample would be much less than 10%.
91. For a discussion of shareholder activism by organized labor, see Marleen O’Connor, Organized Labor
as Shareholder Activist: Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capitalism, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1345 (1997);
DAVID H. WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON (2018)
[hereinafter WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER].
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managed by political appointees or elected officials92 and, according to the
supporters of the conflict theory, are heavily influenced by political motives,93
special interest proposals account for the majority (55.7%) of social proposals.
Critics of “special interests” proposals point out that the low shareholder
support received by these proposals is strong evidence that the proponents have
goals and preferences that are very different from those of other shareholders.
Indeed, when social proposals first appeared on the corporate landscape,94
shareholders showed very little support for them. The proposals of Campaign
GM, for example, which was the first important instance of stockholder politics
in the 1970s, obtained less than 3% of shareholder votes.95 Throughout the
1980s, social proposals obtained very low support on average;96 in the 1990s,
the highest vote category of social proposals received on average only 12.4% of
the votes;97 and in the period between 2000 and 2003, the average support for
the most voted social proposals (those on climate change and renewable
energies) was 13% (while the average overall support for social proposals was
much lower, reaching a four-year high of 9.4% in 2003).98
However, the picture emerging from my empirical analysis is significantly
different from the old pictures from the 1970s throughout the early 2000s.
Indeed, despite the systematic opposition of management, shareholder support
for social proposals has been increasing dramatically. On average, social
proposals in my sample received 23.1% of shareholder support. However, as
Figure 1 shows, whereas in 2010 average shareholder support was 18%, in 2021
it had almost doubled to 35.4%.

92. Aleksandar Andonov, Yael V. Hochberg & Joshua D. Rauh, Political Representation and Governance:
Evidence from the Investment Decisions of Public Pension Funds, 73 J. FIN. 2041, 2052–55 (2019).
93. See, e.g., Romano, Less Is More, supra note 38, at 226; see also Romano, Public Pension Fund
Activism, supra note 38.
94. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 43; Liebeler, supra note 38.
95. Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals, supra note 38, at 59.
96. See, e.g., Romano, Less Is More, supra note 38, at 186 n.30 (reporting that in the 1980s social
responsibility proposals gained less than 3% of the votes).
97. Id.
98. Robert Monks, Anthony Miller & Jacqueline Cook, Shareholder Activism on Environmental Issues: A
Study of Proposals at Large US Corporations (2000-2003), 28 NAT. RES. F. 317, 321 (2004).
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FIGURE 1: AVERAGE SHAREHOLDER SUPPORT

The recent rise in the level of average shareholder support varies based on
the topic of the proposal. Shareholder support for proposals on climate change
rose from 20.3% in the first half of the sample period (2010–2015) to 32.2% in
the second half (2016–2021); shareholder support for proposals on political
spending and activity rose from 24.7% (2010–2015) to 30.3% (2016–2021);
shareholder support for proposals on sex, gender and race issues remained
relatively stable, from 26.4% (2010–2015) to 27.4% (2016–2021); and
shareholder support for proposals on labor and inequality issues rose from only
10.3% (2010–2015) to 26.8% (2016–2021).
Although only a very small fraction of the proposals (3.3%) is formally
approved by shareholders, the fraction of proposals obtaining substantial
minority support has grown drastically over the examined period. As Figure 2
shows, of all social proposals put to a vote, the number of proposals obtaining
more than 30% of shareholder support has grown from 25.5% in 2010 to 60%
in 2021, and the number of proposals obtaining more than 20% of shareholder
support has grown from 45.4% in 2010 to 71% in 2019.
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FIGURE 2: PROPOSALS WITH SIGNIFICANT MINORITY SUPPORT

While it is true that these proposals rarely obtain a majority of votes, this
does not necessarily imply that most shareholders are opposed to them.
Shareholders do not have strong incentives to focus on corporate decisions, both
financial and social ones, and follow management recommendations unless
some issues become particularly salient or contentious.99 Therefore, substantial
minority support for a proposal opposed by management is often a reliable
indicator that the issue is, in fact, relevant to most shareholders.100 In recognition
of this fact, the SEC, for example, adopted in the past important regulatory
reforms or interpretive guidance that were explicitly demanded by a small
minority of shareholders, on the grounds that such minority support showed the
significance of those demands for investors in general.101

99. See, e.g., Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Management Influence on Investors: Evidence from
Shareholder Votes on the Frequency of Say on Pay, 33 CONTEMP. ACC. RES. 1337, 1339–40 (2016) (arguing,
based on empirical evidence, that management recommendation has a causal effect on shareholder support and,
in particular, that proposals supported by the management obtain an additional 26% of votes compared to
proposals opposed by the management, other things being equal).
100. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., James D. Nelson & Roberto Tallarita, The
Untenable Case for Keeping Investors in the Dark, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (discussing various
arguments for why minority support for shareholder proposal does not necessarily mean that a majority would
oppose the proposal and might be an indication that the proposed resolution is in fact widely desirable for most
shareholders).
101. For example, in 1992, the SEC mandated disclosure of executive compensation arrangements for public
companies, in part on the grounds that a significant minority of shareholders had consistently demanded more
information on executive compensation, although the average shareholder support for these proposals was only
11.2%. Similarly, the significant rise of (minority) shareholder support for proposals on climate change in the
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Furthermore, the number of approved proposals has been growing
dramatically, from about 1% from 2010 to 2019 to 12.4% in 2020 and 19.2% in
2021. Finally, 18% of all the proposals in the sample were withdrawn by the
proponents before the annual meeting, typically after a settlement with the
company.102 It is reasonable to consider these withdrawals as successful cases
for the proponents. Indeed, this is how the most active proponents of social
proposals view them.103 If we combine approved and withdrawn proposals in the
same category of successful proposals, as Figure 3 does, in 2021, 40.1% of all
submitted proposals were fully successful, up from only 9.3% in 2019.
FIGURE 3: APPROVED AND WITHDRAWN PROPOSALS

The evidence discussed above does not seem consistent with the view that
social proposals aim at exceedingly narrow and idiosyncratic objectives that
conflict with those of other shareholders. Interestingly, among all the social
responsibility proposals submitted by institutional actors, those submitted by
labor unions and public pension funds (often regarded as the quintessential
examples of special interest proposals) receive substantially more shareholder
support than proposals submitted by socially responsible investment managers.
1990s and 2000s, together with the pressure from large institutional investors, was one of the motivating factors
leading the SEC to release its 2010 interpretive guidance on climate change disclosure.
102. For a study of shareholder proposal settlements, see generally Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal
Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262 (2016).
103. See infra Part IV.C.5.
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Table 7 reports results of regressions where the outcome variable is the
average shareholder support obtained by social proposals, and the independent
variable is a categorical variable for the type of proponent. The proposals
examined are all the proposals in the sample that went to a vote, with the
exclusion of the proposals submitted by individuals and proposals for which
FactSet does not report the name of the proponent, for a total of 1,330 proposals.
The baseline group of proponents is socially responsible investment managers,
which, although driven by both financial and social objectives, respond directly
to their clients and do not necessarily represent specific interest groups (although
they may advise nonprofit organizations with specific social goals).
TABLE 7: SHAREHOLDER SUPPORT FOR “SPECIAL INTERESTS” PROPOSALS

Social & Policy Orgs
Labor Orgs
Public Pension Funds
Market Cap
Topic
Industry
Year
Observations

Average Shareholder Support
(1)
(2)
-0.87
-0.44
(1.02)
(0.94)
2.63*
3.69***
(1.43)
(1.31)
8.84***
5.88***
(1.18)
(1.14)
NO
NO
NO
NO
1,330

YES
YES
YES
YES
1,328

Column (1) reports the regression coefficients without any control
variables. The result indicates that proposals submitted by “special interests”
obtain equal or larger shareholder support than proposals submitted by socially
responsible investment managers. Proposals by social and policy organizations
obtain on average slightly lower shareholder support but the result is not
statistically significant. By contrast, proposals by labor organizations and public
pension funds obtain larger support than proposals by socially responsible
investment managers and the result is statistically significant.
Column (2) estimates the coefficient after controlling for market
capitalization, industry, year of the annual meeting, and topic of the proposal.104
The result confirms the aforementioned conclusions: proposals by social and
policy organizations obtain substantially the same shareholder support as
proposals by socially responsible investment managers, whereas proposals by
labor organizations and public pension funds obtain larger support. Thus,
contrary to the conflict theory, shareholders consider proposals by “special

104. See supra note 86.
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interests” as being similar and perhaps more valuable than social proposals by
other proponents.105
B. PROFIT THEORY
An alternative theory—the profit theory—argues that the anomaly of social
proposals is only apparent. According to this view, the political, social, and
environmental goals of social proposals are only intermediate goals, whereas
their ultimate goal is the maximization of profits and shareholder value. If this
theory held true, stockholder politics would be just another form of shareholder
value maximization, consistent with the traditional understanding of the public
corporation. Like the conflict theory, the profit theory captures some partial
truths but fails to explain important aspects of this phenomenon.
Over the past two decades, an emerging literature has provided empirical
support to the claim, consistent with the profit theory, that social responsibility
might be good for business. For example, some studies have found that a valueweighted portfolio of companies with high employee satisfaction “earned an
annual four-factor alpha of 3.5% from 1984 to 2009, and 2.1% above industry
benchmarks”;106 that “firms with good ratings on material sustainability issues
significantly outperform firms with poor ratings”;107 that customers are willing
to pay an average premium of 16.8% for “socially responsibly produced”
products and services;108 that social responsibility proposals that pass by a small
margin improve labor productivity and sales;109 that companies with higher
social and environmental performance are more competitive in the market for
government procurement contracts;110 and that companies that adopt
sustainability policies outperform their counterparts in the long run, in terms of
both stock market and accounting performance.111 A recent meta-analysis found

105. In a 1998 study, Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin reported a similar result with respect to laborsponsored shareholder proposals. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to Make
Shareholder Proposals, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 44 (1998) (“[L]abor-sponsored proposals received a statistically
significant higher percentage of favorable votes than did similar proposals sponsored by private institutions and
individuals.”).
106. Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles? Employee Satisfaction and Equity
Prices, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 621, 621 (2010); see also Alex Edmans, Lucius Li & Chendi Zang, Employee
Satisfaction, Labor Market Flexibility, and Stock Returns Around the World 1 (ECGI Finance, Working Paper
No. 433/2014, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2461003 (finding that employee satisfaction is associated with
superior long-run returns in flexible labor markets, such as the US and UK).
107. Mozaffar Khan, George Serafeim & Aaron Yoon, Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on
Materiality, 91 ACCT. REV. 1697, 1697 (2016).
108. Stephanie M. Tully & Russell S. Winer, The Role of the Beneficiary in Willingness to Pay for Socially
Responsible Products: A Meta-Analysis, 90 J. RETAILING 255, 255 (2014).
109. Caroline Flammer, Does Corporate Social Responsibility Lead to Superior Financial Performance? A
Regression Discontinuity Approach, 61 MGMT. SCI. 2381, 2549 (2015).
110. Caroline Flammer, Competing for Government Procurement Contracts: The Role of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 39 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1299, 1299 (2018).
111. Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on
Organizational Processes and Performance, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2835, 2835 (2014).
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“a highly significant [and] positive” relation between corporate social
responsibility and financial performance.112
However, the evidence is not as clear as it may seem. For example, some
studies have found that, on average, “investors respond slightly negatively to the
release of positive [corporate social responsibility] news”113 and that the
relationship between social and environmental performance and financial
performance is positive for some firms and negative for other firms.114 A survey
of 128 academic papers found that the causal link between corporate social
responsibility and financial performance is not demonstrated, and “59% of
studies report a positive relationship between [corporate social performance] and
financial performance, 27% report a mixed relationship, and 14% report a
negative relationship.”115 The current approach to the problem in management
studies includes the recognition that the relationship between corporate social
responsibility and financial performance is complex and likely depends on
several contingencies.116
Moreover, the fact that some socially responsible strategies increase firm
value and that some shareholders might indeed be advancing social proposals
for their indirect effect on stock value does not imply that most such proposals
are profit enhancing or that most shareholder-proponents act for that reason. It
is quite easy to think of an array of possible measures in favor of employees,
product safety, or the environment that, beyond a certain point, would likely
result in a net cost for shareholders. Indeed, even a quick review of the proposals
in my sample show that many proposed resolutions seem primarily or
exclusively driven by social and environmental concerns, not by financial
concerns.
Consider, for example, the proposal on food waste submitted to Amazon in
2019 and discussed in Part I.A. The proposal requested the company to issue a
report “on the environmental and social impacts of food waste generated from
the company’s operations given the significant impact that food waste has on
societal risk from climate change and hunger.”117 According to the profit theory,
reducing food waste would not only produce social and environmental benefits
but would also improve Amazon’s firm value, perhaps by enhancing Amazon’s
reputation with some groups of customers. Or consider a proposal on
“inequitable employment practices” submitted to Alphabet in 2019.118 The
112. Timo Busch & Gunnar Friede, The Robustness of the Corporate Social and Financial Performance
Relation: A Second-Order Meta-Analysis, 25 CORP. SOC. RESPONS. & ENV’T MGMT. 583, 583 (2018).
113. Philipp Krüger, Corporate Goodness and Shareholder Wealth, 115 J. FIN. ECON. 304, 306 (2015).
114. Michael L. Barnett & Robert M. Salomon, Does It Pay to Be Really Good? Addressing the Shape of
the Relationship Between Social and Financial Performance, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1304, 1304 (2012).
115. John Peloza, The Challenge of Measuring Financial Impacts from Investments in Corporate Social
Performance, 35 J. MGMT. 1518, 1521 (2009).
116. See, e.g., Kwang-Ho Kim, MinChung Kim & Cuili Qian, Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility on
Corporate Financial Performance: A Competitive-Action Perspective, 44 J. MGMT. 1097 (2018).
117. Amazon.com, Inc., 2019 Proxy Statement, supra note 29, at 15.
118. Alphabet, Inc., 2019 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 64 (Apr. 30, 2019).
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shareholder-proponent criticized “a suite of contractual arrangements involving
their employees,” including “no-poaching agreements” with competitors Apple
and Microsoft,119 non-compete covenants for entry-level employees, and
mandatory arbitration clauses.120 The proposal requested Alphabet to commit
not to use any of these contractual practices. In this case, the profit theory would
argue that more equitable employment practices would allow Alphabet to attract
talented employees, improve their morale, and ultimately increase productivity
and profits.
On a closer look, however, the profit rationale of these proposals is far from
clear. It is certainly plausible that adopting some policies to reduce food waste
might in theory have a positive effect on Amazon’s brand value. However, it is
not obvious that such effect would be larger than the cost. Yet the proposal does
not even try to compare the costs of the proposed policies with the expected
benefits for shareholders. In fact, the text of the proposal is almost exclusively
focused on social and environmental problems and how Amazon could alleviate
those problems by reducing food waste.121
Likewise, in the “inequitable employment practices” proposal, the
proponent claims that Alphabet and its main competitors have entered into “nopoaching” arrangements, whereby they committed not to hire the employees of
one another. But if Alphabet and its competitors entered into such pacts, they
did it as a way to restrict competition in the labor market, and thus reduce the
salaries they pay to their employees.122 It is not obvious that putting an end to
this practice, in addition to benefitting employees, would also provide a financial
benefit to the company and its shareholders. In fact, it is reasonable to expect the
opposite effect.123
These examples are not isolated cases. Although measuring quantitatively
the prevalence and type of financial rationale in shareholder proposals is
impractical, my review of the social proposals in the sample reveals that many

119. In a no-poaching pact, two or more companies agree not to recruit one another’s employees.
120. Alphabet, Inc., 2019 Proxy Statement, supra note 118, at 64.
121. Id. (Most of the supporting statement focuses on the public dimension of these practices, which
according to the proponent “burden the economy,” “impede labor mobility,” “prevent the discovery and redress
of misconduct,” “introduce labor market inefficiencies,” “preclude employees from suing in court for wrongs
like wage theft,” and hold other detrimental consequences for employees and for society at large rather than for
Amazon and its shareholders. The proposal very briefly mentions “employee morale” and “human capital
management” as possible business reasons to abandon inequitable employment practices).
122. For a discussion of “no-poaching” agreements, see, for example, Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen
Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 544–47 (2018).
123. A different conclusion might be reached if the company enters into “no-poaching” agreements that are
in violation of antitrust law. In that case, the legal liability might potentially exceed the benefit derived from the
use of the agreements. For example, in 2015, several tech companies including Alphabet (then Google) settled
for $415 million a class action suit brought by former employees on the grounds that the no-poaching agreements
among their employers illegally reduced their salaries. Dan Levin, U.S. Judge Approves $415 Million Settlement
in Tech Worker Lawsuit, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2015), https://reut.rs/2GaraTK. However, it is worth noting that the
2019 shareholder proposal discussed in the example does not even mention the class action and the relevant
settlement. See Alphabet, Inc., 2019 Proxy Statement, supra note 118, at 64.
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proposals do not even mention a financial rationale or do so in a perfunctory or
superficial way, without explaining how the proposed resolution is supposed to
increase shareholder value.
For example, many proposals on the disclosure of corporate political
spending fail to include a financial rationale and instead mention the importance
of transparency for shareholders and its relevance for the proper functioning of
the U.S. democracy.124 Other proposals follow the same template but add a
sentence stating that the lack of transparency may create reputational and
business risks, without further elaboration.125
Furthermore, many proposals (especially on environmental issues)
mention regulatory risk as a reason to adopt the proposed policy. But if
regulatory risk were the real driver of these proposals, we should conclude that
the proponents would be largely indifferent between the elimination of the
regulatory risk and the elimination of the underlying environmental problem.
Indeed, both solutions would address the regulatory risk. A regulatory risk can
be addressed, for example, by lobbying legislators and regulators in order to
avoid or reduce the expected regulatory burden. But while oil companies, for
instance, are known for lobbying, directly and indirectly, against environmental
regulation,126 it seems implausible that supporters of environmental proposals
would approve of such strategy.
On the contrary, the text and context of these proposals clearly suggest that
the proponents’ preoccupation is about the environmental risk, not the regulatory
restrictions that such risk might prompt. In fact, the data shows that many
proposals are presented or supported by organizations that actively advocate for
more aggressive regulation on environmental and social issues.127 The purported
rationale of regulatory risk, therefore, does not seem a genuine motivation for

124. See, e.g., Cintas Corp., 2019 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 36 (Sept. 17, 2019); CarMax, Inc., 2019
Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 68 (May 6, 2019); American Airlines Group, Inc., 2019 Proxy Statement (Form
14A) 19 (Apr. 29, 2019); Roper Technologies, Inc., 2019 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 45 (Apr. 30, 2019);
Range Resources Corp., 2018 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 67 (Apr. 6, 2018); Wynn Resorts, 2018 Proxy
Statement (Form 14A) 53 (Apr. 18, 2018); J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc., 2018 Proxy Statement (Form
14A) 41 (Mar. 13, 2018).
125. See, e.g., Western Union Co., 2018 Proxy Statement (Form 14 A) 72 (Apr. 4, 2018); AT&T, Inc., 2011
Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 26 (Mar. 3, 2010); NextEra Energy Inc., 2017 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 25
(Mar. 27, 2017).
126. See, e.g., Jillian Ambrose, ExxonMobil Tried to Get European Green Deal Watered Down, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/mar/06/exxonmobil-tried-to-geteuropean-green-deal-watered-down-claims-climate-lobbying-watchdog.
127. Several frequent filers of environmental proposals in my sample explicitly advocate for stricter
environmental regulation. For some recent examples among the ten most frequent filers of environmental
proposals, see Environment, PARK FOUND., https://parkfoundation.org/program-interests/?id=2#id-2 (last visited
July 31, 2022) (mentioning its commitment to “resisting all new gas and oil drilling”); A Green New Deal Is a
Smart Deal for Investors, AS YOU SOW: BLOG (July 30, 2019), https://www.asyousow.org/blog/2019
/7/30/green-new-deal-investors (supporting federal regulation to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions);
1st Quarter 2021 ESG Impact Report, BOS. TR. WALDEN (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.bostontrustwalden
.com/insights/1st-quarter-2021-esg-impact-report (mentioning an “investor letter to the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and Congress against large-scale mining in Alaska’s Bristol Bay”).
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these proposals and is, instead, either a rhetorical device or a perfunctory
formula aimed at persuading financially driven shareholders.
***
The discussion in this Part has shown that both the conflict theory and the
profit theory capture some partial truths on stockholder politics but fail to
explain important aspects of it. We need a richer theory to understand this
phenomenon. I will try to propose one in Part IV.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF STOCKHOLDER POLITICS
Part III has shown that the conventional theories of stockholder politics—
the conflict theory and the profit theory—fail to adequately explain important
aspects of the phenomenon. This Part presents an alternative framework, in
which stockholder politics should be understood as a matchmaking enterprise
that connects shareholders with prosocial and expressive motives on one side
and extra-corporate actors (stakeholders, activists, concerned citizens) on the
other side. A relatively small number of specialized players (“stockholder
politics specialists”) perform this matchmaking role. Specialists “sell”
information, monitoring, and voting opportunities to shareholders interested in
socially relevant issues, and they “sell” corporate voice to outside actors,
including employees, consumers, and citizens concerned about corporate
externalities.
Subpart A argues that shareholder preferences are the product of a bundle
of diverse motives—financial, prosocial, and expressive—rather than the
product of financial motives alone. Subpart B examines the group of extracorporate actors interested in accessing corporate voice. Subpart C examines the
role of “stockholder politics specialists,” a group of specialized players with a
peculiar structure of costs and incentives that connect the two groups of
shareholders and extra-corporate actors.
A. SHAREHOLDERS WITH PROSOCIAL AND EXPRESSIVE MOTIVES
1.

Preferences and Motives

Economists use the term “preference” to indicate an agent’s ranking of
available options.128 Suppose that a shareholder can choose between full
disclosure and secrecy of the company’s political donations. We say that the
shareholder prefers disclosure if, all things considered, she ranks disclosure
higher than secrecy. But why does the shareholder end up ranking the two
options in that particular order?
I contend that the determinants of a particular ranking (or preference) are
many and complex. As our daily experience suggests, we hardly rank our options
128. See DANIEL M. HAUSMAN, PREFERENCE, VALUE, CHOICE, AND WELFARE 7 (2011) (“[P]references in
economics are rankings that express total subjective comparative evaluations.”).
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according to a single criterion. At a restaurant, we choose from the menu based
on several factors, including our tastes, our concern for health and appearance,
and sometimes, our desire to impress our companions. When evaluating a job
offer, we give a lot of weight to salary, but we also consider location, reputation
of the firm, or the social value of the job. Some of these factors are weightier
than others, but more than just one factor eventually influences our final
decision. A decision model that reduces our preferences to a single dimension
would struggle to make sense of our choices.
Similarly, assuming that shareholders only care about the return on their
investment is a very useful simplification in most contexts, but it seems
unhelpful when we study social proposals. How would shareholders decide, in
our example, whether to vote in favor of disclosure of the company’s political
donations or against it? To make such a decision, shareholders would probably
consider the financial effects of the disclosure of political donations. For
example, opaque donations might be used by managers to obtain personal
benefits from politicians at the expense of shareholders, but at the same time,
disclosure of profit-maximizing donations might create reputational damage,
which would harm shareholder value (consider, for example, an oil company
lobbying to block socially desirable environmental regulation).129
However, shareholders might also consider, at least to some extent, the
political consequences of those donations—which candidates and policy
proposals are supported with shareholder money, and which moral and political
values are associated with the company’s political spending. Most people care
about these aspects and are willing to bear some financial cost in this regard.
Therefore, the final ranking of the available options will be the product of a
combination of different criteria—or, to employ the terms that I will use in this
Article, the final “preference” of shareholders will be the product of a
combination of different “motives.”
2. Prosocial and Expressive Motives
When evaluating social proposals, which focus on issues affecting public
welfare, shareholders might be driven, at least to some extent, by prosocial
motives.130 In the literature on social and ethical investing, prosocial motives
have been modeled in different ways. These models posit that some shareholders
refuse to hold shares in companies that engage in some socially or ethically

129. For a discussion of the issues raised by the transparency of political spending, see generally Bebchuk,
et al., supra note 100.
130. See, e.g., Hart & Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare, supra note 4 (proposing
a model in which shareholders have prosocial motives); David H. Webber, Professor, Boston U. Sch. of L.,
Remarks as 2016 Visting Scholar in Residence in Corporate and Business Law at Delaware Law: Rethinking
“Political” Considerations in Investment (Sept. 12, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3736936 (arguing that many
shareholders are interested not only in financial performance but also in policy or political goals).
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unacceptable behavior,131 that they discount the share price of “bad”
companies,132 or that they treat shares as a composite instrument blending “an
investment vehicle together with a charitable giving vehicle.”133
In these and other similar models, the key assumption is that some investors
have pure or impure altruistic motivations, and, therefore, they consider the nonfinancial impact of the company’s activities when making investment
decisions.134 The existence of partially altruistic motives behind consumption
and investment decisions fits many people’s intuitions and experiences, and it
has found support in empirical studies.135
This theory seems to explain some of the aspects of social proposals that
the conventional profit theory seemed unable to explain. In particular, it explains
why the text of social proposals focuses on social and environmental benefits
rather than the financial benefits for shareholders, and why shareholders vote for
policies that are likely to impose net financial costs on the company. Driven by
prosocial motives, some shareholders may decide to pay a price in order to
benefit others and therefore may prefer a given prosocial policy even if it results
in a net financial cost.
Shareholders may also choose a given socially relevant option in order to
express their moral and political values. Both financial motives and prosocial
motives follow a consequentialist pattern: shareholders act in a certain way
because they expect that those actions will bring about a desired state of the
world, whether it is an increase in profits or an increase in welfare for employees,
local communities, or society as a whole.
However, people sometimes act to express their moral and political stances,
regardless of the effects of their actions on future states of the world. Some social
proposals might be an instance of this phenomenon. In one version of this
hypothesis, these proposals are mere “statements” or “social signaling,” aiming
131. See, e.g., Robert Heinkel, Alan Kraus & Josef Zechner, The Effect of Green Investment on Corporate
Behavior, 36 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 431, 434 (2001).
132. See, e.g., Amir Barnea, Robert Heinkel & Alan Kraus, Corporate Social Responsibility, Stock Prices,
and Tax Policy, 46 CAN. J. ECON. 1066, 1067–69 (2013).
133. Joshua Graff Zivin & Arthur Small, A Modigliani-Miller Theory of Altruistic Corporate Social
Responsibility, 5 TOPICS IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 2 (2005).
134. A pure altruistic motivation is the mere desire for certain goods being provided to other individuals.
By contrast, an impure altruist gives to others for partially selfish motivations: for example, because of the status
or social recognition associated with charitable giving, or because of the psychological reward (“warm glow”)
associated with giving. See James Andreoni, Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and
Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1447, 1447 (1989).
135. See generally, e.g., James Andreoni & John Miller, Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test
of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism, 70 ECONOMETRICA 737 (2002) (reporting results of a laboratory
experiment in which subjects show varying degrees of “rational” altruistic preferences, i.e., altruistic preferences
that are consistent with a utility maximization function); Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social
Preferences with Simple Tests, 117 Q. J. ECON. 817 (2002) (finding that experimental subjects show altruistic
preferences for choices that increase total social welfare, especially when benefitting subjects with low payoffs);
Arno Riedl & Paul Smeets, Why Do Investors Hold Socially Responsible Mutual Funds?, 72 J. FIN. 2505 (2017)
(finding that a majority of investors in socially responsible funds expect these funds to underperform relative to
conventional funds, and that prosocial motives have a key role in the decision to invest in such funds).

1736

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:6

at conveying information about the proponent (for example, that the proponent
has certain values or belongs to a certain cultural or political group).136 In
another version, social proposals are principle-based actions, chosen for their
intrinsic value rather than for their expected consequences.137 I will refer to both
types of motives as “expressive motives.”
While versions of this theory are common in moral and legal philosophy,138
limited attention has been paid to it by corporate governance scholars.139 A
significant advantage of an expressive theory of stockholder politics is that it
offers a plausible explanation for the observed gap between aspiration and
voting outcome. As shown in Part II.E above, only 3.3% of the social proposals
in my sample received the required majority of votes. From a mere
consequentialist perspective, whether rooted in financial interests or in altruistic
goals, such systematic misalignment between actions and consequences seems
puzzling and, perhaps, even irrational. By contrast, if we think of these proposals
as expressive acts, whose value is in the act itself rather than in its effects, their
failure to result in approved resolutions does not seem problematic.140 When we
allow for the coexistence of different motives—financial, prosocial, and
expressive motives—the apparent anomalies of social proposals become much
less evident.
3.

Passive, Reactive, and Proactive Shareholders

The above “bundle of motives” theory explains why shareholders may be
interested in how corporate decisions affect outside groups and society in
general. However, acting on prosocial and expressive motives can be expensive
136. For a discussion of social signaling in consumer behavior, see, for example, Olivia Johnson & Veena
Chattaraman, Conceptualization and Measurement of Millennial’s Social Signaling and Self-Signaling for
Socially Responsible Consumption, 18 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 32 (2019).
137. For a classic discussion of the importance of “integrity” as a motivation for human action, see Bernard
Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 108–10 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard
Williams eds., 1973).
138. For a discussion of the role of “symbolic utility” in policy, see, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF
RATIONALITY 26–35 (1994). For a theory of “expressive norms,” see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS
AND ECONOMICS 17–43 (1993). For the role of the “expressive dimension” in regulatory policy, see, for example,
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 65–72 (1995),
and Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
139. Some exceptions are Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 95–97 (2010) (mentioning the expressive significance of corporate political
spending as a reason for aligning the preferences of directors and shareholders with respect to such spending);
Bebchuk, et al., supra note 100, at 20 (discussing expressive significance as one of the reasons for mandating
disclosure of corporate political spending to shareholders). An adjacent view is the one proposed in Marcel
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1997 (2014) (explaining
shareholder activism on some controversial corporate governance issues, from supermajority votes to proxy
access, as rituals with a symbolic social function).
140. This hypothesis echoes, to some extent, the expressive theories of voting in democratic systems. For
the first modern formulation of this problem, see ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
(1957). For a modern discussion of the problem, see, for example, DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 303–
32 (2003). For an overview of expressive theories in public choice theory, see Alan Hamlin & Colin Jennings,
Expressive Voting, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC CHOICE 333, 334 (2019).
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and therefore shareholders might remain passive despite their social and political
preferences. It is well established in the corporate governance literature that
shareholders are mostly apathetic or reticent with respect to traditional corporate
decisions.141 The same attitude applies, I argue, to socially relevant decisions.
A shareholder proposal on social and environmental issues must be
prepared and drafted carefully in order to comply with the intricate rules and
interpretations developed by the SEC over the years. Then, it must be submitted
to the company within the applicable deadline and with the proper modalities.
The proponent must provide a proof of compliance with certain formal
requirements; and if, as often happens, the company seeks a no-action letter from
the SEC in order to exclude the proposal, the proponent should be ready to file
a response to the company’s objections.142
To gauge the magnitude of effort by shareholder-proponents, I analyzed
the documents filed by the parties in the no-action request process regarding the
300 proposals included in the SEC Record Subsample. I considered three
different dimensions: the size of the decision record, which is an imperfect, but
reasonable proxy of the time and resources spent by the involved parties;
whether the proponent filed a written response to the company’s no-action letter
request; and whether the record contains evidence that the proponent and the
company discussed the content of the proposal. Table 8 reports the findings of
this analysis.

141. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
142. Although the proponent has no obligation to respond to the company’s requests, most do respond, as
shown infra in Table 8: Active Effort of Proponents.
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TABLE 8: ACTIVE EFFORT OF PROPONENTS
Effort Dimension
File Size
Mean
Median
25% Percentile
75% Percentile
Proponent Written Response
No Response
Response
In-house
Outside Counsel
Engagement with the Company
Evidence of engagement
Withdrawal

Measure
57.7 pages
41.5 pages
27 pages
65 pages
47.7%
52.3%
27.3%
25.0%
21.3%
15.9%

As the data show, the mean (median) size of the decision record is 57.7
(41.5) pages. Records in the top quartile group are sixty-five pages long or more.
More importantly, proponents filed a formal response with the SEC about half
of the time (52.3%). These responses were prepared either in house (27.3%) or
by outside counsel (25%).
Finally, the last dimension I considered is whether the proponent discussed
the proposal with the company in writing, in person, or by audio or video
conference. The record shows evidence of engagement in 21.3% of the cases. In
some cases, the engagement consisted only of a phone call or an exchange of
written comments by email, but in many cases the company and the proponent
met in person to discuss the proposal, sometimes more than once. In many cases,
the company and the proponent negotiated and reached a settlement in which the
proponent agreed to withdraw the proposal and the company committed to take
certain steps in the direction indicated in the proposal. In several cases, the
company and the proponent memorialized the agreement in an email or in a
signed written document.
Taken together, these findings show that social proposals are, at least in
many cases, an expensive activity, which involves not only the elaboration and
filing of the proposal, but often also the review of lengthy documents, the filing
of a formal response, and active engagement with the company. While many
shareholders may have prosocial and expressive motives, to varying degrees, in
most cases these motives are unlikely to be strong enough to induce shareholders
to incur the substantial costs required to file and promote social proposals. Just
like they are rationally apathetic or reticent with respect to financial issues, most
shareholders are likely to be equally apathetic or reticent with respect to socially
relevant issues. They may react and vote on proposals that have been prepared,
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submitted, and presented by someone else, but they are much less likely to take
an active role.
We can therefore propose a taxonomy of shareholder attitude on social
issues, based on the intensity of their motives. Passive shareholders are those
who are unlikely both to submit proposals and to vote on proposals submitted
by others. Reactive shareholders are those who are unlikely to submit proposals
but are likely to review and vote on proposals submit by others. Active
shareholders are those who have sufficiently strong motives to invest the
resources to submit proposals to the company.
As I will show in Subpart C, most social proposals are submitted by a
relatively small number of repeat players, but an increasing number of these
proposals receive substantial minority or even majority support. Therefore, a
plausible estimate of the average composition of shareholders in large public
companies is that only a very small minority of shareholders is active, while a
growing number of shareholders is reactive.
B. EXTRA-CORPORATE ACTORS
A widely accepted view among economists and legal scholars is that social
welfare is best served when private goods are provided by private actors through
the market and public goods are provided by the government.143 In the real
world, however, large public companies are powerful players in the public
sphere. They wield significant influence on social and ethical issues, spend
money on political elections, lobby legislators and regulators on policy issues,
and shape the public debate.144 Therefore, the ideal separation between
corporations and the public sphere is a normative construction with little
correspondence to reality.
Within the corporate machinery, managers occupy the most powerful
position. By commanding significant financial resources as well as social and
political connections (with the media, elected officials, regulators, providers of
financial capital, etc.), managers are central nodes in the sociopolitical network
in which companies operate. To borrow a term of art from network theory,
managers play a pivotal role—that is, many other important nodes of the
network cannot be reached (or cannot be reached so easily) without the kind of
access to the corporate machinery that corporate leaders enjoy.
Economists and sociologists who study social networks measure this
characteristic in several ways.145 For our purposes, however, we can simply refer
to a central position in a network as a position of “power.”146 Corporate
143. For a discussion of the classic economic theoretical approach to corporate social responsibility, see, for
example, Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack, Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility,
50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 51 (2012).
144. For an analysis of corporate spending on political elections, see, for example, Bebchuk et al., supra
note 100.
145. See, e.g., MATTHEW O. JACKSON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS 61–69 (2008).
146. See DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS 339–42 (2010).
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managers occupy a position of power in the broad sociopolitical network thanks
to their role within the corporation. CEOs have become influential thought
leaders, trusted by the government and by citizens on policy matters. They not
only spend shareholder funds to influence public decisions, but also leverage
their role to operate in the public space in their individual capacity.147
It is thus unsurprising that many people who formally operate outside the
corporate organization are interested in how corporate managers exercise their
power and are willing to influence the relevant process. The management
literature traditionally refers to these interested actors as “stakeholders,”148
although the question of who should be considered a stakeholder is quite
contentious.149 For our purposes, however, we do not need to delve into any
definitional dispute: many individuals, groups, and institutional actors may have
legitimate reasons to try to influence corporate decisions, whether because they
are a contractual counterparty (employees, suppliers, customers), because they
are directly or indirectly affected by corporate behavior (local residents, local
government, human beings generally affected by global climate change), or
because of their moral, social or political values.
While shareholders with prosocial and expressive motives have the legal
tools to influence corporate decisions but lack strong incentives to do so
effectively, many outside actors do have strong incentives but lack corporate
voice. In order to accomplish their goals, these two groups need to connect. This
is what stockholder politics specialists do.
C. STOCKHOLDER POLITICS SPECIALISTS
A remarkable finding of my empirical analysis is that a majority of social
proposals in the sample (53.4%) are submitted by only twenty-five
organizations.150 Table 9 lists these leading players.

147. See Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, Roberto Tallarita & David Weiss, The Politics of CEOs, 11 J. L.
ANALYSIS 1, 9–12 (2019).
148. The seminal work in this literature is R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT (1984). For a
recent overview of the management literature on stakeholder theory, see generally Sergiy D. Dmytriev, R.
Edward Freeman & Jacob Hörisch, The Relationship Between Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Social
Responsibility: Differences, Similarities, and Implications for Social Issues in Management, 58 J. MGMT.
STUD. 1441 (2021).
149. For an overview of the literature on stakeholder identification, see generally Donna J. Wood, Ronald
K. Mitchell, Bradley R. Agle & Logan M. Bryan, Stakeholder Identification and Salience After 20 Years:
Progress, Problems, and Prospects, 60 BUS. & SOC. 196 (2018).
150. This calculation is based on a total of 2,680 for which FactSet records the name of the main proponent.
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TABLE 9: LEADING STOCKHOLDER POLITICS SPECIALISTS
Proponent

Proposals

New York City Retirement Systems

201

New York State Common Retirement Fund
The National Center for Public Policy Research

169
133

Trillium Asset Management LLC

132

Harrington Investments, Inc.

70

NorthStar Asset Management, Inc.
Boston Trust Walden, Inc.
AFL-CIO Reserve Fund

56
55
50

Mercy Investment Services, Inc.
Unitarian Universalist Association

49
41

The Nathan Cummings Foundation

40

As You Sow

38

Domini Impact Investments LLC
Green Century Capital Management, Inc.

37
37

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals

37

Calvert Investment Management, Inc.

33

International Brotherhood of Teamsters
The Sisters of St. Francis of Philadelphia
The Province of St. Joseph of the Capuchin Order

33
33
30

AFSCME Employee Pension Fund

28

Friends Fiduciary Corp.
Holy Land Principles, Inc.

28
27

Trinity Health System

26

The Park Foundation, Inc.
Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement System

25
22

Total

1,430

As I will argue below, these and other repeat players, which I refer to as
“stockholder politics specialists,” perform the role of connecting shareholders
and outside actors on socially relevant issues. Their motivations and business
models vary, but they enjoy two crucial advantages over “regular” shareholders,
which make them especially fit to perform such role. First, their costs for
preparing, submitting, and promoting social proposals are much lower than
those of other shareholders, thanks to specialization, economies of scale, and
economies of scope. Second, their incentives to pursue certain socially relevant
goals are larger, since they aggregate and represent outside constituencies and
outside interests, as well as donors concerned about those constituencies and
interests. I will examine each of these aspects in turn.
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1. Specialized Players
One peculiar feature of stockholder politics is that, in many cases,
shareholder-proponents play only a nominal role compared to the substantive
role that is played by professional intermediaries. To illustrate, consider a
proposal presented at the 2019 annual meeting of DowDuPont, regarding some
public health risks related to the construction of new petrochemical plants in the
Gulf Coast region.151 The shareholder submitting the proposal was The Gun
Denhart Living Trust, a trust created by entrepreneur and impact investor Gun
Denhart.152 However, the Trust did not act directly vis-à-vis the company.
Instead, it was represented by As You Sow, a non-profit organization engaged
in environmental and social responsibility advocacy.153 As You Sow, like other
similar organizations, performs the role of shareholder advocate on behalf of the
actual shareholder-proponent. It identifies potential target companies on social
and environmental issues, prepares the proposal and the accompanying
statements and materials, interacts with the company’s management, and files a
formal response with the SEC when the company seeks a no-action letter.
I found that 35% of all the proposals in the SEC Record Subsample were
filed by shareholder advocates or other representatives of shareholders on behalf
of individuals, charities, family foundations, or other shareholders. Furthermore,
82% of all direct filings (without an intermediary) were made by institutional
actors with substantial expertise in socially relevant shareholder proposals.
Therefore, almost nine proposals out of ten were prepared and promoted by
stockholder politics specialists, whether in their own name or on behalf of other
shareholders.
Specialists operate according to different models. Some are advocates
(such as As You Sow, Investor Voice, or Proxy Impact) that partner with
nominal shareholders to file proposals on their behalf.154 Others (such as Jantz
Management, Trillium Asset Management, or Zevin Asset Management) are
registered investment advisers, and, therefore, offer their clients both standard
investment management services (which include, however, social and
environmental considerations) and socially oriented corporate voice.155 Some of

151. DowDuPont, Inc., 2019 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 66 (Apr. 29, 2019).
152. Andy Giegerich, Gun Denhart Talks Impact Investing, BUS. J. (Sept. 6, 2011), https://www.bizjournals.
com/portland/blog/sbo/2011/09/gun-denhart-talks-impact-investing.html.
153. About Us, AS YOU SOW, https://www.asyousow.org/about-us (last visited July 31, 2022).
154. These organizations are not asset managers and, based on my own findings, do not seem to invest
directly in the companies they engage with. Occasionally, the leaders of the organization buy stock in the
company and serve as nominal shareholder-proponent. For example, Andrew Behar, CEO of As You Sow, is
the proponent of fifteen proposals in my entire sample, and Christine Jantz, CEO and principal owner of Jantz
Management LLC is the shareholder-proponent of eight proposals.
155. See, e.g., Jantz Management, LLC., Brochure 4, 17 (Jan. 31, 2021) (“The firm’s objective is to provide
our clients with active return at an acceptable level of risk in a diversified stock portfolio. We aspire to do this
while being a socially responsible enterprise that is respectful of our client’s values . . . In addition, it is JM’s
policy to actively engage with companies whose securities are held in client portfolios; specifically it is [Jantz
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these socially responsible investment managers also advise mutual funds that
incorporate social and environmental goals in their investment strategy (so
called “ESG funds”).156
By contrast, religious groups typically invest their own assets (or the assets
of affiliated congregations and organizations), and in doing so, they give
significant weight to the moral and social beliefs and values of their members.
For example, the Unitarian Universalist Common Endowment Fund is an
investment vehicle for endowment funds, trust funds, and other funds of the
Unitarian Universalist Association and related organizations,157 and is
responsible for forty-one proposals in my sample. Similarly, Mercy Investment
Services, Inc., which filed forty-one of the proposals in my sample, coordinates
the investment of endowment funds and other assets of the Sister of Mercy, with
a view to “advocate for systemic change and enhance their financial resources
for the mission and the support of their members.”158
Policy and social activists buy shares in public companies or receive shares
from donors in order to be able to submit shareholder proposals on topics of
interest for the organization members and supporters.159 For example, PETA
(People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals), which filed thirty-seven
proposals in my sample, “file[s] resolutions, attend[s] meetings, and engage[s]
in negotiations on a regular basis in order to ensure that companies are working
toward eliminating animal testing.”160 The National Center for Public Policy
Research, which filed 133 of the proposals in my sample, is a conservative

Management]’s policy to bring shareholder proposals encouraging companies in the portfolios to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions . . . [and] to address their humanitarian crises responses.”).
156. See, e.g., Trillium ESG Global Equity Fund, Prospectus 17 (Oct. 31, 2020) (“We are devoted to aligning
stakeholders’ values and objectives, combining impactful investment solutions with active ownership with the
goal to provide positive impact, long-term value, and “social dividends.” Trillium’s shareholder advocacy is
primarily conducted by a dedicated advocacy team which uses multiple tools of engagement including direct
dialogue, filing or co-filing shareholder proposals, working within multi-stakeholder institutions, convening
company/stakeholder meetings, investor and proxy advisor education, and speaking publicly about ESG topics.
We work in coalitions and individually. Examples of Trillium’s shareholder engagement topics include, but are
not limited to, climate change, workplace diversity, supply chain responsibility, and human rights. Trillium votes
Funds’ shares on shareholder proposals and other proxy matters consistent with our fiduciary duties to the Fund.
Many of those proposals are on ESG topics and our proxy voting guidelines incorporate ESG matters and votes
are executed accordingly. Trillium regularly voices its perspective on public policy matters that relate to ESG
topics.”).
157. THE UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST COMMON ENDOWMENT FUND, LLC., INVESTMENT INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM 1 (2020), https://uucef.org/files/2020/03/Investment-Information-Memorandum-1-2020-sdhv2.pdf.
158. History, MERCY INV. SERVS., INC., https://www.mercyinvestmentservices.org/history-.aspx (last
visited July 31, 2022).
159. See, e.g., Shareholder Campaigns, PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS,
https://www.peta.org/issues/animals-used-for-experimentation/shareholder-campaigns (“Over the years, PETA
has obtained shares in companies by purchasing them or receiving them as donations from members and
supporters. As partial owners of a publicly traded company, shareholders are entitled to bring resolutions to a
vote during its annual meeting, and PETA does just that in order to encourage the company to replace animal
testing with non-animal methods.”) (last visited July 31, 2022).
160. Id.
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organization that “files shareholder resolutions, engages corporate CEOs and
board members at shareholder meetings, petitions the SEC for interpretative
guidance, and sponsors effective media campaigns to create the incentives for
corporations to stay focused on their missions.”161
Finally, union and public pension funds manage retirement savings in the
interest of their members.162 In performing this role, these funds tend to stress
the importance of engagement on governance and social and environmental
issues as a means to improve corporate performance.163 The language used by
these investors resembles the key tenets of the profit theory discussed in Part
III.B; however, such theory might be used by these institutions only to provide
a legal justification to their sociopolitical activism,164 whereas in reality these
funds might pursue some political and policy goals independently of their
instrumental effect on profits and financial returns.165 Indeed, a prominent legal
scholar has compellingly shown that pension funds’ capital has been used to
promote labor’s interests and is indeed “labor’s last best weapon.” 166
Regardless of their specific business model, all these organizations are
highly specialized repeat players, with dedicated staff and substantial expertise
in shareholder proposals. Unlike regular shareholders who happen to voice their
personal social and political views, stockholder politics specialists have in depth
knowledge of specific sociopolitical issues and of the shareholder proposal
mechanism.
2. Coalitions and Networks
Many leading players of stockholder politics frequently cooperate with one
another. They have established long-standing relationships, cooperate on the
filing of many proposals, and coordinate large-scale campaigns on specific
issues. Table 10 shows that more than one in five proposals in the SEC Record
Subsample (21.7%) have at least one other major specialist as a co-filer.

161. About the Free Enterprise Project, NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y RSCH., https://nationalcenter.org/
programs/free-enterprise-project (last visited July 31, 2022).
162. See generally Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Principles in Pension Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019).
163. See, e.g., Shareholder Advocacy, AFL-CIO, https://aflcio.org/what-unions-do/social-economicjustice/shareholder-advocacy (“In recent years, corporate social responsibility has become an increased focus
area for shareholder resolutions. This reflects a growing recognition that these issues affect company
performance.”) (last visited July 31, 2022); N.Y. COMMON RET. FUND, 2020 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
STEWARDSHIP REPORT 2 (2021) (“At the center of the Fund’s ESG investment philosophy is the belief that highperforming, diverse boards of directors, good governance, and prudent management of environmental and social
factors provide the foundation for sustainable long-term company success.”).
164. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience:
The Law and Economics of EG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 397–98 (2020) (arguing that
pension fund trustees are allowed to take social and environmental factors into account only to the extent relevant
to maximize return).
165. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber, Pension Fund Activism: The Double-Edged Sword, in THE FUTURE OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 271, 288–89 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Gary Anderson eds., 2009).
166. WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER, supra note 91.
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Moreover, in 38.7% of those proposals, the main filer is affiliated with Ceres or
the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), two of the most active
shareholder advocacy organizations on social and environmental matters. If we
count both the affiliation of the main proponent and the affiliation of
representatives and co-filers, 61.3% of the proposals in the SEC Record
Subsample are handled by affiliates of Ceres or ICCR.
TABLE 10: INSTITUTIONAL ECOSYSTEM
Type of Proponent
Coalitions
Solo Individual Filings
Solo Institutional Filings
Individual Co-Filings
Institutional Co-Filings
Networks
Ceres
ICCR
Ceres and/or ICCR
Coalition with Ceres/ICCR

Proposals
26.0%
52.3%
5.3%
16.4%
32.3%
25.7%
38.7%
61.3%

Another telling sign of the level of coalitional networking in stockholder
politics is that the same attorney represented the proponent (or its representative)
in 68.9% of the cases in the SEC Record Sample for which the proponent was
assisted by outside counsel. Collaborations also occur through more informal
channels. For example, the Unitarian Universalist Association partnered with
the New York City public pension funds to allow the latter to send
representatives to the annual meetings of companies targeted by social proposals
(thanks to the hundreds of local Unitarian Universalist congregations).167
3. Horizontal Filings
Many social proposals are simultaneously filed at more than one company.
To gauge the magnitude of this phenomenon, I compared the text of the proposed
resolutions for the proposals included in the SEC Record Subsample and found
that a majority (54%) of those resolutions were filed, over a period of three years,
in at least two different companies. Notably, one in four proposals were filed
with an identical (or substantially identical) text at six or more companies. Table
11 reports the relevant findings.

167. Shareholder Advocacy, Partnership with New York City’s Comptroller Office, UNITARIAN
UNIVERSALIST COMMON ENDOWMENT FUND, https://uucef.org/socially-responsible-investing/shareholderadvocacy (last visited July 31, 2022).
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TABLE 11: HORIZONTAL FILINGS
Type of Filing
Single company
2 or 3 companies
4 or 5 companies
6 or more companies
Total horizontal filings

4.

Proposals
46.0%
22.6%
6.0%
25.4%
54.0%

Complementary Advocacy Activities

Most stockholder politics specialists use their expertise on socially relevant
issues as well as complementary activities, such as public policy advocacy,
lobbying, thought leadership, media campaigns, and so on. To illustrate, Table
12 reports the complementary activities performed by the twenty proponents
with the largest number of proposals in the entire sample, based on the
information available on their institutional websites. Seventeen of the twenty
most frequent filers of social proposals engage in other forms of socially relevant
advocacy, such as direct engagement with public companies (for example,
petitions, letters, or dialogue with management) or policy advocacy (in the form
of thought leadership, media campaigns, lobbying, etc.) on socially relevant
issues. Some of these organizations also use litigation strategies to obtain
protections for employees, consumers, animals, or the environment.
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TABLE 12: COMPLEMENTARY ACTIVITIES OF TOP TWENTY PROPONENTS
Proponent

New York City Retirement Systems
New York State Common Retirement Fund
Trillium Asset Management LLC
National Center for Public Policy Research
Harrington Investments, Inc.
NorthStar Asset Management, Inc.
Boston Trust Walden, Inc.
AFL-CIO Reserve Fund
Mercy Investment Services, Inc.
Unitarian Universalist Association
The Nathan Cummings Foundation
As You Sow
Domini Impact Investments LLC
Green Century Capital Management, Inc.
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
Calvert Investment Management, Inc.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
The Sisters of St. Francis of Philadelphia
Province of St. Joseph of the Capuchin Order
AFSCME Employee Pension Fund

Other
Engagement
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Policy
Advocacy
X
X
X
X

Litigation

X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

For example, Trillium Asset Management, a socially responsible
investment manager that is recorded as the main filer of 108 proposals in the
sample (4.5%), engages companies outside the formal shareholder proposal
process (with meetings, letters, etc.),168 issues white papers on social and
environmental policy issues,169 and has filed amicus briefs in LGBT rights
cases.170 The New York State Retirement System, which is the main filer of 167
proposals in the sample (6.9%), as well as a co-filer of many other proposals, is
headed by a democratically elected official, the New York State Comptroller,
who pressures regulators on some of the same issues that are the object of the
168. Firm Overview, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT. (2021), https://www.trilliuminvest.com/documents/firmoverview (last visited July 31, 2022).
169. White Papers & Webinars, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., https://www.trilliuminvest.com/resources/
whitepapers-webinars (last visited July 31, 2022)
170. See Leadership on LGBT Issues, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., https://www.trilliuminvest.com/
leadership-corporate-engagement/trilliums-leadership-on-lgbt-issues (“In July 2019, Trillium joined an amicus
brief . . . on three United States Supreme Court cases which sought to prohibit employment discrimination based
on sexual orientation or gender identity as forms of sex discrimination. Trillium had been part of a similar amicus
brief in 2017, and in 2012 Trillium supported another amicus brief challenging the federal Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA) in Gill v. Office of Personnel Management.”) (last visited July 31, 2022).
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funds’ shareholder proposals.171 Similarly, other major institutional proponents,
such as the New York City Retirement System and Boston Trust Walden
(formerly Walden Asset Management) publicly advocate for policy
interventions on the same issues as those addressed in their shareholder
proposals.172 Some organizations occasionally use litigation, as a plaintiff or
amicus curiae, to advance social causes.173
5.

Representing Extra-Corporate Interests

The features analyzed so far show that stockholder politics specialists can
perform their role at a much lower cost than “regular” shareholders.
Specialization and coalitional networking substantially reduce the cost of
submitting and promoting social proposals. The average cost of proposals is
further lowered by the practice of horizontal filings: in this way, the effort and
resources needed to research and elaborate a proposal on a given issue can be
spread over several companies for which the issue happens to be relevant.
Finally, many leading stockholder politics specialists engage in other socially
relevant activities that are to some extent complementary to shareholder
proposals. This means that the knowledge acquired with respect to certain issues
can be applied not only to shareholder proposals, but also to these other
activities, including thought leadership, other forms of engagement with
corporate management, media campaigns, lobbying, policy advocacy, and
litigation. In short, specialists can rely on substantial economies of scale and
scope that make the choice of such an expensive strategy more affordable.
But costs are only one side of the equation. Specialists have strong
incentives to engage in stockholder politics because they obtain larger benefits
from such activity than regular shareholders. Just like hedge funds take a
171. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, EARTH DAY SUSTAINABILITY UPDATE (2020)
(reporting that “[i]n an April 2019 letter, Comptroller DiNapoli had argued that [the Environmental Protection
Agency’s decision not to regulate emissions of mercury and other pollutants] . . . would be ‘unconscionable’”).
Note that, due to legal constraints, pension funds cannot take into account social and environmental factors that
do not have an instrumental link to profits. Therefore, they tend to present financial motives as the main reason
for their social proposals and sociopolitical activity in general.
172. See, e.g., Press Releases, OFF. OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, https://comptroller.nyc.gov/
newsroom/press-releases (last visited July 31, 2022); BOS. TR. WALDEN, 3RD QUARTER 2020 ESG IMPACT
REPORT (2020), https://www.bostontrustwalden.com/insights/3rd-quarter-2020-esg-impact-report (“In
September, we joined an investor coalition requesting the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU)
perform an assessment of the future of the natural gas industry, including goals that also achieve a fair and
equitable transition [to a low-carbon economy].”).
173. See Leadership on LGBT Issues, supra note 170; see also AFL-CIO Sues OSHA for Emergency
Temporary Standard to Protect Workers, AFL-CIO (May 18, 2020), https://aflcio.org/press/releases/afl-ciosues-osha-emergency-temporary-standard-protect-workers (reporting that AFL-CIO, which is the main filer of
2% of the proposals in the sample, sued the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration to protect
employee rights during the COVID-19 pandemic); Lawsuit Looms Over Animal Care at Pymatuning Deer Park,
PETA (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.peta.org/media/news-releases/lawsuit-looms-over-animal-care-atpymatuning-deer-park (reporting that PETA, which is the main filer of 1.4% of the proposals in my sample, sent
an official notice Endangered Species Act to the operators of the Pymatuning Deer Park for alleged mistreatment
of animals).
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proactive role on business strategies because they and their managers have a
larger exposure than most other shareholders to the financial performance of the
company,174 stockholder politics specialists take a proactive role on socially
relevant issues because they have a larger exposure than many other
shareholders to the company’s social impact. This larger exposure derives, in
part, from stronger prosocial and expressive motives of the individuals directly
involved in this activity (for example, socially oriented investors in ESG mutual
funds). More importantly, however, stockholder politics specialists act as
intermediaries for a large number of extra-corporate actors—workers,
consumers, and citizens with specific social and political preferences—who
have various financial, prosocial, or expressive interests in those issues.
Specialists provide these actors internal corporate representation in exchange for
donations, fees, or political support.
An important implication of the extra-corporate dimension of stockholder
politics is that the success of social proposals can be measured on a larger scale
than that of the individual company. One of the puzzling aspects of stockholder
politics is that proponents persevere in spite of a systematic failure to obtain
shareholder approval.175 To solve this puzzle, one might suggest that stockholder
politics is largely an expressive phenomenon, and therefore success, as
traditionally intended, is not its actual goal. According to this theory, the very
act of presenting and promoting the proposal realizes its expressive value.176
This might be true in part. However, the most active proponents seem to
care about the success of their proposals. For example, the New York State
Common Retirement Fund tracks and publicizes not only the number of
shareholder proposals filed, but also the number of successful settlements
reached as well as the few proposals passed.177 So do the New York City

174. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors,
31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 104–06 (2017).
175. See supra Part II.E.
176. See supra Part IV.A.2.
177. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE COMMON RET. FUND, 2019 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STEWARDSHIP REPORT 14
(2020), https://www.osc.state.ny.us/files/reports/special-topics/pdf/2019-corporate-governance-stewardshipreport.pdf (reporting that in 2019, the Fund filed forty-six shareholder proposals, reached agreements with
twenty-five companies “to implement the Fund’s shareholder proposals,” and obtained a seventy-eight percent
vote in support of one proposal).
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Retirement Systems,178 Trillium,179 NorthStar,180 Boston Trust Walden,181 and
many others.
When we consider, however, that stockholder politics specialists represent
extra-corporate interests and therefore operate at a larger scale than that of the
individual corporation, the anomaly at issue becomes much less obvious.182
Indeed, some specialists are not interested exclusively in the formal approval of
the proposal, or even in the managerial actions taken by the individual target
company, but also (and, in some cases, predominantly) in the broader effects of
their initiatives on the industry, region, and society at large.183
Such broader changes do not necessarily require the formal approval of the
proposal at the annual meeting. To begin with, there is empirical evidence that
proposals that receive substantial minority support might lead to company-level
changes.184 Moreover, these proposals might lead to changes in industry-level
practices or to self-regulation. In this respect, stockholder politics can be
interpreted as a strategy similar to boycotts, protests, and other social activism
initiatives against corporations. Management literature contains many examples

178. N.Y.C. RET. SYS., 2019 SHAREOWNER INITIATIVES POSTSEASON REPORT 5 (2020),
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/2019_Shareowner_Initiatives_Postseason_Report
.pdf (“During Fiscal Year 2019, the Comptroller’s Office, on behalf of one or more of the NYCRS, submitted
58 shareowner proposals to a total of 57 portfolio companies. Overall, approximately 72 % of the proposals (42
of 58) were withdrawn after the companies agreed to take steps to implement the request. Fourteen proposals
went to a vote during the fiscal year, two of which received majority shareowner support.”).
179. See, e.g., TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., SHAREHOLDER ADVOCACY HIGHLIGHTS 1–2 (2019),
https://www.trilliuminvest.com/leadership-corporate-engagement/trilliums-q3-q4-2019-shareholder-advocacyhighlights (“[A] shareholder proposal [on agricultural pesticides presented] at Lamb Weston . . . received a 34%
vote, signaling that the company needs to take further steps. A similar proposal filed at General Mills resulted
in additional disclosures of its pesticide use reduction strategies . . . .”).
180. See, e.g., NORTHSTAR ASSET MGMT., SOCIAL CHANGE AND ACTIVISM ANNUAL REPORT 2019-2020, at
5 (2020) (“NorthStar’s engagements by shareholder proposal continue to be highly productive – resulting in an
engagement and/or successful negotiation for 72% of the shareholder proposals we filed this year.”).
181. Impact Investing, BOS. TR. WALDEN, https://www.bostontrustwalden.com/investment-services/impact
-investing (“Since 1987, we have filed 541 shareholder resolutions, with more than 42% withdrawn based on
negotiated agreements with companies.”) (last visited July 31, 2022).
182. An early example of this phenomenon was “Campaign GM,” the campaign led in 1970 by the
Shareholders Committee for Corporate Responsibility to approve several shareholder social proposals presented
at the annual meeting of General Motors. The proposals obtained less than three percent of the votes, but the
campaign was nonetheless “hailed as a success,” in that it raised public awareness of certain social and
environmental issues and contributed to the creation of a public policy committee at General Motors. Schwartz,
Towards New Corporate Goals, supra note 38, at 59–60.
183. The effect of governance proposals on market practice is recognized in the literature. See, e.g., David
H. Webber, Reforming Pensions While Retaining Shareholder Voice, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1001, 1006–08 (2019)
(arguing that labor unions and public pension funds, through their shareholder activism, were the “driving force”
behind important corporate governance innovations such as “proxy access, majority voting, and the destaggering
of corporate boards”). My contention here is that stockholder politics activists try to replicate the same model
on socially relevant issues.
184. See Jody Grewal, George Serafeim & Aaron Yoon, Shareholder Activism on Sustainability Issues
(Harv. Bus. School Working Paper, No. 17-003, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2805512; see also Cathy Hwang & Yaron Nili, Shareholder-Drive Stakeholderism, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE
(Apr. 15, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/04/15/shareholder-driven-stakeholderism-hwangnili.
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of social activism leading to industry-wide initiatives and self-regulation.185
Stockholder politics specialists could aim at similar results.
Furthermore, a consistent, substantial support by shareholders, although
well below the threshold for a formal approval, might lead to regulatory reforms.
Finally, social proposals and the complementary advocacy initiatives and media
campaigns can affect the public perception of certain issues and, consequently,
elected officials’ willingness to regulate them. A vast literature in political
science has focused on how public opinion affects policy outcomes,186 and there
is empirical evidence that political mobilization by advocacy groups can shift
public attitudes and preferences on major policy issues.187 Therefore, if the goal
of proponents of social proposals (and their backers) is not just some companylevel decision, but, more generally, policy and social change, the failure to obtain
formal shareholder approval should not be seen as a failure to the extent that its
proposals contribute, together with complementary activities, to the shifting of
public opinion and, ultimately, to policy and social change.
To be sure, it remains an open empirical question whether stockholder
politics is in fact successful at the industry and societal level. However, the mere
fact that social proposals continue to be filed despite receiving a relatively small
fraction of affirmative votes is not conclusive evidence that stockholder politics
is inconsequential.
***
This Part has proposed an alternative theory to explain stockholder politics
and the relevant supporting evidence. According to this theory, stockholder
politics is the activity of a relatively small number of specialized players who
connect shareholders with prosocial and expressive motives on one side and
extra-corporate actors interested in the social impact of corporate decisions on
185. See, e.g., NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, THE GREENING OF INDUSTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS 165–70 (1994)
(describing the Vehicle Recycling Partnership formed by General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler in 1991 to increase
postconsumer recycling of the nonmetallic components of automobiles); JOSE MIGUEL ABITO, DAVID BESANKO
& DANIEL DIERMEIER, CORPORATE REPUTATION AND SOCIAL ACTIVISM 1–4 (2019) (describing the creation in
1999—in the wake of scandals and protests against sweat shops in Asia—of the Fair Labor Association, an
international organization of industry players, activists and experts that sets humane labor standards); Steven
Greenhouse & Stephanie Clifford, U.S. Retailers Offer Plan for Safety at Factories, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2013,
at B1 (on the formation in 2013 of the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, including major U.S. retailers
Wal-Mart, Gap, Target and Macy’s, to improve fire and safety standards in factory buildings in Bangladesh).
For further examples, see John W. Maxwell, Thomas P. Lyon & Steven C. Hackett, Self‐Regulation and Social
Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J.L. & ECON. 583, 584–86 (2000), and
David P. Baron, Private Politics, 12 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 31 (2003).
186. For a general overview, see Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, Effects of Public Opinion on Policy,
77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 175 (1983); BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY
YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICANS’ POLICY PREFERENCES (1992); Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, The Politician and
the Judge: Accountability in Government, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1034 (2004).
187. See, e.g., Robert J. Brulle, Jason Carmichael & J. Craig Jenkins, Shifting Public Opinion on Climate
Change: An Empirical Assessment of Factors Influencing Concern Over Climate Change in the U.S., 2002–
2010, 114 CLIMATIC CHANGE 169 (2012) (finding that political mobilization by elites and advocacy groups had
a larger effect on public opinion on climate change than dissemination of scientific information and extreme
weather events).
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the other side. Stockholder politics specialists are able to perform this role thanks
to specialization, coalitional networking, horizontal filings, and economies of
scope, and they have strong incentives to do so as they aggregate and represent
extra-corporate interests affected by the company’s socially relevant decisions.
Part V will discuss how this theory of stockholder politics illuminates the
potential benefits and costs of this phenomenon.
V. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF STOCKHOLDER POLITICS
This Part will apply the analytical framework presented so far to examine
the potential benefits and costs of stockholder politics for corporate governance,
as well as its policy implications.
A. THE BENEFITS OF STOCKHOLDER POLITICS
The shareholder proposal process is costly for companies and, therefore,
for shareholders. The company must review the proposal, engage with the
proponent, in many cases present its case to the SEC, and eventually (if the
proposal is included in the ballot) print and distribute the proposal to all
shareholders.188 Furthermore, each additional item of discussion and
deliberation absorbs an additional fraction of the limited time and attention of
management and shareholders. Shareholders ultimately pay for all these costs.
Why should all shareholders pay for the social proposals of a few of them?
The framework presented in this Article so far provides a convincing
answer. Companies face an agency problem with respect to socially relevant
issues, and social proposals mitigate this problem by producing information and
voting opportunities for uninformed and inattentive shareholders. Traditionally,
corporate governance theory focuses on agency problems in the financial
domain.189 Since shareholders are rationally apathetic or reticent,190 managers
have the opportunity to make decisions that serve their own private interests at
the expense of profits and shareholder value.
However, agency problems may also occur with respect to political, social,
environmental, or moral issues. Shareholders have political and social beliefs
and values, and managers may make corporate decisions that deviate from
shareholder preferences in those domains.191 Stockholder politics is a tool to
mitigate this type of problem.

188. See Exchange Act Release No. 89964, supra note 5, at 49–50.
189. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737,
737 (1997) (“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which the suppliers of finance to corporations assure
themselves of getting a return on their investment.”).
190. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
191. A recent empirical study has found that the divergence in political preferences between shareholders
and management is strongly associated with the number of social proposals. See generally Geeyoung Min &
Hye Young You, Active Firms and Active Shareholders: Corporate Political Activity and Shareholder
Proposals, 48 J. L. STUD. 80 (2019).
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Therefore, rational shareholders should be willing to bear a cost in
exchange for the beneficial function performed by stockholder politics
specialists. Even if not all proposals prove interesting or valuable to
shareholders, those that do might justify the entire cost of the mechanism. Thus,
companies have a compelling reason to subsidize stockholder politics.192
In theory, lawmakers, regulators, and courts (in short, policymakers) face
the normative problem of finding the optimal level of subsidy—the one for
which the marginal dollar spent for social proposals produces one dollar of
benefits for shareholders, in terms of financial, prosocial, and expressive value.
In practice, real world policymakers must experiment with tentative or partial
solutions, which can then be revised as the underlying phenomenon evolves and
the policymakers’ understanding of it improves.
In this pragmatic vein, the regulator should start with the observation that
many social proposals have been proving increasingly valuable to
shareholders.193 Judging from the dramatic increase in shareholder support, there
is a reasonable argument to be made that social proposals create some value for
shareholders.
But is the value that they produce enough to justify their cost? According
to a recent SEC survey, each shareholder proposal costs a company between
$20,000 and $150,000.194 Considering that the fifty most frequent target
companies in my sample received on average only 2.4 social proposals per year,
the maximum total annual cost of social proposals would be an average of
$360,000 per company. To put things in perspective, this means that a frequent
target company spends on social proposals less than one-fifth of the
compensation paid to the general counsel of the smallest of those target
companies.195 Whether this cost is too high depends on the benefits that
shareholders obtain from the filing of social proposals. The exact calculation is
impossible, but the aforesaid estimate, which is conservatively based on the
highest cost estimates collected by the SEC, suggests that the current cost of
social proposals is not unreasonable on its face.
Nonetheless, in 2020, the SEC approved a systematic revision of Rule 14a8 that substantially restricts access to the shareholder proposal mechanism and
specifically targets certain distinctive features of stockholder politics examined
in this Article, such as the professional representation of shareholders and
coalitions of co-filers.196 For example, the new rule raises the minimum
192. A related but different theory, recently proposed by James Cox and Randall Thomas, argues that the
shareholder proposal system should be thought as a “corporate public square,” in which shareholders share their
view on a broad range of issues, not only to provide information to the directors of that individual company, but
also to provide information to corporate directors generally. See generally Cox & Thomas, supra note 4.
193. See supra Part III.A.2.
194. Exchange Act Release No. 89964, supra note 5, at 49–50.
195. See Ameren Corp., 2020 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 63, 65 (Mar. 26, 2020).
196. Exchange Act Release No. 89964, supra note 5. In its cost-benefit analysis, the SEC considered other
costs in addition to the cost for the company to examine, challenge, print, and distribute shareholder proposals,
such as the cost for non-proponent shareholders to review the proposals that are included in the proxy statement.
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ownership requirements to file a proposal, bars co-filers from aggregating their
shares to meet those requirements, and requires shareholder-proponents to offer
their availability to discuss the proposal with the company (even if they are
represented by shareholder advocates).197
An analysis of Rule 14a-8 and its recent amendments is beyond the scope
of this Article. However, it is worth noting that these restrictions seem
misguided. The SEC analysis behind the proposed amendments and the final
rule does not seem to acknowledge the positive function of stockholder politics
specialists, as examined in this Article. In fact, these restrictions seem
specifically aimed at limiting the role of specialists and strengthening the role of
retail shareholders, who have weaker incentives and lower expertise than
specialists and are therefore less likely to produce quality proposals for other
shareholders.
Another difficult normative question concerns the content of social
proposals. Stockholder politics plays a desirable role so long as it produces
proposals that are largely in line with shareholder preferences.198 But
stockholder politics specialists might be driven by motivations and goals that do
not necessarily correspond to those of other shareholders.199 As the “conflict
theory” points out, specialists might be motivated by idiosyncratic
preferences.200 Should policymakers regulate the content of social proposals in
order to filter out proposals that are not valuable for shareholders, and if so,
how?
For decades the SEC has been trying to police the content of social
proposals through Rule 14a-8(i)(7), which allows companies to exclude
proposals that deal “with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business
operations.”201 In a nutshell, the “ordinary business” exclusion provides that
shareholder proposals can be excluded if they instruct management on how to
run the company. The rationale of the rule is the traditional separation of powers
between shareholders and management. The conventional governance structure
of a public company is such that business decisions are made by management,

This cost is not inherent in the shareholder proposals mechanism—shareholders can ignore the proposals in
which they are not interested—but is mainly due to the fact that many institutional investors are under an
obligation to vote on all proposals and therefore spend money on acquiring and processing information about
them, often retaining an external advisor for that purpose. Therefore, I do not address this problem in this Article.
197. Id.
198. Social proposals that conflict with shareholder preferences would nonetheless be socially desirable if
their net effect on general welfare were positive. Some proposals, for example, even if supported by only a small
minority of shareholders, could affect public opinion and, indirectly, policymaking, in a way that might increase
social welfare. The discussion of this alternative normative criterion, however, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
199. See generally, e.g., John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Opportunistic Proposals by Union
Shareholders, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 3215 (2019) (finding that unions use shareholder proposals on executive
compensation and other corporate governance matters to influence contract negotiation with management).
200. See supra Part III.A.
201. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2020).
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not shareholders.202 Shareholders can replace directors who underperform but
cannot directly take on the role of main decision-makers.203
An important aspect of the interpretation of the “ordinary business”
exclusion is that the exclusion does not apply when the proposal “raises a policy
issue that transcends the particular company’s ordinary business operations,” as
determined by the SEC staff based on a company-specific evaluation.204 This
approach gives the SEC staff considerable discretion in deciding whether a given
proposal can be included in the proxy. As a result, the “ordinary business”
exclusion has been the subject of repeated and inconsistent interpretive
guidance, in the attempt to clarify a standard that is inherently arbitrary.205
Unsurprisingly, over the years the SEC has erratically changed its approach to
the admissibility of proposals regarding tobacco manufacturing, plant closings,
charitable contributions, affirmative action, and other socially salient topics.206
As reported in Table 13, in the SEC Record Subsample the “ordinary
business” exclusion is the most frequent basis for the granting of no-action
letters by the SEC.

202. Technically, the certificate of incorporation might provide that the company is managed directly by
shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2021) (“The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may
be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”). In practice, however, public
corporations are run by professional managers under the supervision of a board of directors. See JAMES D. COX
& THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 9.1 (3d ed. 2019).
203. Id. § 9.12 (“Each shareholder has a right to have the corporation’s affairs managed by its board of
directors. This right is derived from the statute under which the corporation is organized and from the
corporation’s charter and bylaws. Statutory, charter, and bylaw provisions for management by the directors are
viewed as part of a control among the shareholders. Consequently, a majority of the shareholders cannot deprive
the minority of their right to the directors’ judgment and discretion.”).
204. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14K, supra note 71, § B2.
205. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 40018, 1998 WL 254809 (May 21, 1998) (discussing “a consistent
topic of widespread public debate” as an important factor to conclude that the proposal could not be excluded);
SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14C, 2005 WL 6283646 (June 28, 2005) (on when proposals concerning equity
compensation plans “transcend” ordinary business decisions); SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E, 2009 WL
4363205 (Oct. 27, 2009) (revising the staff on proposals concerning “the evaluation of risk” connected to
significant policy issues); SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H, 2015 WL 7796498 (Oct. 22, 2015) (commenting
on the distinction between “significance and transcendence” of the social policy issue, in light of the Third
Circuit decision in Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, 792 F.3d 323, 332 (3d Cir. 2015)); SEC Staff Legal
Bulletin No. 14I, 2017 WL 5127243 (Nov. 1, 2017) (acknowledging that the “significant policy exception”
requires determinations that “often raise difficult judgment calls” and requesting the board of directors to provide
a well-developed analysis to assist the staff with its assessment).
206. See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation,
45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 906–07 (1994) (examining the many policy shifts in the SEC jurisprudence on what
constitutes an excludable “ordinary business” issue and what is instead a “significant public policy issue”).
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TABLE 13: GROUNDS FOR SEC NO-ACTION LETTERS
Regulatory Exclusion
Ordinary Business
Substantially Implemented
Minimum Ownership
Duplicative Proposal
Resubmission Threshold
Missed Deadline
Personal Grievance
Intention to Hold the Stock
Violation of Law

Granted NALs
55.2%
14.5%
12.4%
7.6%
5.5%
2.1%
1.4%
0.7%
0.7%

More than half of the no-action requests granted by the SEC are based on
the “ordinary business” exclusion. This means that most proposals are excluded
from the ballot on the basis of an ambiguous and discretionary standard, which,
by the SEC’s own admission, often requires “difficult judgment calls,”207 and
which needs constant clarifications and fine-tuning on the part of the
Commission and the staff. Furthermore, the existence of such standard
encourages drafters of social proposals to disguise the real subject of the
proposed resolution and make it vaguer and duller in order to avoid rejection for
being “overly prescriptive.”208
This state of affairs is in need of systematic reform.209 To begin with, the
separation of powers between shareholders and managers does not justify
limiting shareholder power in a way that harms shareholder interests. Even the
staunchest defenders of director primacy210 and the theorists of shareholders’
high “competence costs”211 treat the separation of powers between shareholders
and managers as a mere means in the interest of shareholders. If stockholder
politics’ normative justification is predicated on the existence of an agency
problem, as proposed in this Article, agents cannot be allowed to restrict the
functioning of this mechanism, except in cases that are easily verifiable by a
third party (whether a court or the SEC staff). Intricate questions on whether a
207. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14I, supra note 205.
208. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14K, supra note 71.
209. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate and Securities Law Impact on Social Responsibility and Corporate
Purpose, 62 B.C. L. REV. 851, 900–03 (2021) (discussing recommendations for corporate and securities laws on
social responsibility).
210. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (“[D]irector primacy claims that shareholders are the appropriate beneficiaries of
director fiduciary duties. Hence, director accountability for maximizing shareholder wealth remains an important
component of director primacy.”).
211. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and
Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 771 (2017) (arguing that the decision on “how to divide control between
managers and investors,” which in its standard version takes the form described in the text, is essential “to
maximize total returns”).
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certain policy issue “transcends” ordinary business operations leave too much
room for unbridled discretion.
Moreover, the SEC is not well equipped to decide which socially relevant
issues are significant enough to warrant shareholder considerations. The
question is currently treated as a mere technical problem when it is, instead, a
discretionary review on the merits. Therefore, the current system combines the
worst of both worlds: it limits shareholders’ opportunities to express their
preferences, but it does so in a way that escapes public scrutiny, as the imposition
of limits is presented as a neutral technical problem.
By contrast, shareholders are best positioned to indicate whether a given
topic is of interest to them. Recall that shareholder proposals are typically
precatory; that is, they only recommend, and do not obligate, directors to take
the proposed action, even if approved by a majority of shareholders.212
Therefore, whenever some shareholders make a precatory proposal and the other
shareholders vote on it, directors learn something about shareholder preferences
but maintain their power to make the decision that they consider best for the
company.
In November 2021, the SEC staff issued new guidance on the use of the
“ordinary business” exception.213 The new guidance explicitly takes a more
favorable view of social proposals and indicates that the SEC staff “is no longer
taking a company-specific approach to evaluating the significance of a policy
issue under Rule 14a-8(i)(7),” and that “proposals seeking detail or seeking to
promote timeframes or methods do not per se constitute micromanagement.”214
In practice, the 2021 guidance announces the intention of the SEC to allow more
“prescriptive” social proposals and, more generally, to side more frequently with
the proponent in no-action letter proceedings.
This development is a step in the right direction. However, it is only the
temporary posture of the current SEC staff, rather than an actual regulatory
innovation. A rule amendment would be a more appropriate way to deal with
such an important issue.
B. THE COSTS OF STOCKHOLDER POLITICS
Despite its potential benefits, the promise of stockholder politics should not
be overstated. To begin with, its social benefits depend on the actual degree of
prosocial motivations among shareholders. If shareholders are only willing to
bear a very small cost to improve the welfare of employees or reduce carbon
emissions, social proposals are not going to make a difference. More importantly
for the scope of this Article, stockholder politics raises some difficult corporate
governance problems.

212. See supra Part II.D.
213. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L, supra note 6.
214. Id.
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First of all, collective decision-making is costly, and its cost increases as
the dimensions of the decision problems increase. Traditional corporate
decisions have the typical goal of maximizing profits, and most shareholders
arguably agree that, other things being equal, more profits are better than less
profits. Different shareholders will have different views on what strategy is the
most profitable; but directors and managers can be judged on financial results,
and financial results can be measured on a single dimension, that of shareholder
value.
Expanding the space of corporate deliberation to include issues of climate
change, toxic products, employee diversity, gender and race discrimination,
employee rights, political lobbying, and other socially relevant issues inevitably
creates a multidimensionality problem. Shareholder preferences are unlikely to
be measurable on a single dimension, and therefore a decision-making
equilibrium is less likely to occur. The social choice literature has shown that
heterogeneity of voter preferences significantly increases the probability of
“cycles” (that is, inconsistent voting outcomes), whereas “the probability of
cycles declines with the proportion of the population having the same
preferences.”215 According to a political economist, one way to interpret the
multidimensionality literature is “as a prediction of chaos.”216
The multidimensionality problem is often used by critics of social
proposals and stakeholder capitalism to argue that complex decision making on
a variety of social and environmental issues is practically impossible.217 In fact,
an established view in corporate governance is that shareholders are well
positioned to vote precisely because their (financial) preferences are highly
homogeneous.218
However, the current shareholder proposal system is not a decision-making
mechanism. As discussed in Part II.B, shareholder proposals are typically
precatory and do not bind the company. Their main function is to elicit
shareholder preferences and make them known to management. Therefore, the
dangers of a conflicted vote are relatively small: managers can ignore proposals
insofar as they do not represent a sufficiently clear indication of shareholder
preferences.
By contrast, the mechanism can reveal when shareholders seem to agree on
some specific issues. In fact, it would be consistent with the above analysis to
amend the shareholder proposal rule to require management to issue a report on

215. MUELLER, supra note 140, at 99.
216. Joseph C. McMurray, Why the Political World Is Flat: An Endogenous “Left” and “Right” in
Multidimensional Elections (unpublished working paper) (August 2019), https://www.aeaweb.org/conference
/2019/preliminary/paper/nk5sB4sK (manuscript at 2).
217. See, e.g., John G. Matsusaka, A Challenge for Stakeholder Capitalism: Solving the Paradox of Voting,
in MILTON FRIEDMAN 50 YEARS LATER 88, 88–90 (Luigi Zingales, Jana Kasperkevic & Asher Schechter eds.,
2020) (ebook).
218. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 39–44 (1996).
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their assessment and response to all shareholder proposals that obtain
shareholder support above a given threshold.
A more problematic aspect of stockholder politics concerns the role of asset
managers in shareholder voting. Retail shareholders vote their shares much less
frequently than institutional shareholders.219 More importantly, retail
shareholders tend to show less support for social proposals than institutional
shareholders.220 Since institutional investors are fiduciaries of the individual
investors, whose savings they manage, this misalignment of voting decisions is
potentially problematic. The crucial question is whether the voting decisions of
asset managers reflect the underlying preferences of their clients.221
In Subpart A, I argued that the main benefit of stockholder politics, from a
corporate governance perspective, is the mitigation of a managerial agency
problem with respect to socially relevant decisions. But if voting decisions on
social proposals do not reflect the preferences of the ultimate beneficiaries,
stockholder politics is unable to perform such function.
One way to mitigate this problem would be to require asset managers to
periodically report on their votes and to transparently discuss their views on
social and environmental proposals so that individual investors can make their
investment decisions in a more informed way. Some of the largest asset
managers already publish stewardship reports and voting guidelines;222
however, their discussion of social and environmental topics is often clothed in
the rhetoric of shareholder value maximization, and their views often seem too
vague and generic to create an actual sorting of social and policy preferences.223
A more innovative way to address this problem would be to require asset
managers to periodically poll their clients on social and environmental issues
that are frequently voted upon in companies’ annual meetings. In any event, any

219. See Alon Brav, Matthew D. Cain & Jonathon Zytnick, Retail Shareholder Participation in the Proxy
Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting, Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. Fin. Working Paper No. 637/20219 (June
2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3387659 (finding that retail shareholders cast 32% of their shares on average,
compared to 80% rate of participation of the entire shareholder base).
220. Id. at 5.
221. For a discussion of this problem, see Christie, supra note 4, at 907–11; see also Scott Hirst, Social
Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 217 (2018).
222. See generally e.g., BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP, ENGAGEMENT PRIORITIES (2022),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-stewardship-priorities-final.pdf; BLACKROCK
INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP, GLOBAL PRINCIPLES (2022), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/factsheet/blk-responsible-investment-engprinciples-global.pdf; BLACKROCK, INC., OUR APPROACH TO
ENGAGEMENT
WITH
COMPANIES
ON
THEIR
HUMAN
RIGHTS
IMPACTS
(2022),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-commentary-engagement-on-humanrights.pdf; BLACKROCK, INC., CLIMATE RISK AND THE GLOBAL ENERGY TRANSITION (2022),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-commentary-climate-risk-and-energytransition.pdf.
223. For a discussion of the profit-maximizing rhetoric of large asset managers, see Roberto Tallarita,
Fiduciary Deadlock, 170 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2022), Part I (on file with the author).
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reassessment of the shareholder proposal rule must grapple with the agency
problems of institutional investors and must find ways to mitigate it.224
CONCLUSION
Shareholder proposals on political, social, environmental, and ethical
issues are a growing phenomenon that raise fundamental and timely questions
about corporate governance and shareholder democracy. This Article has
presented a comprehensive empirical account of this phenomenon and has
proposed an analytical framework that seeks to illuminate the mechanisms
behind it and their normative implications.
This Article has argued that stockholder politics cannot be entirely
explained by financial motives or by special interest capture, as the conventional
theories hold. Rather, it should be understood as a matchmaking enterprise in
which a relatively small number of specialized actors connect shareholders with
prosocial and expressive motives on one side with corporate stakeholders,
citizens, and social and policy activists on the other side. These specialists “sell”
information, monitoring, and voting opportunities to shareholders interested in
socially relevant issues, and they “sell” corporate voice to outside actors,
including employees, consumers, and citizens concerned about corporate
externalities.
This complex phenomenon has both potential benefits and costs for
corporate governance. On the one hand, it constrains managerial discretion and
reduces agency problems on socially relevant issues by monitoring corporate
activities and eliciting shareholder preferences. On the other hand, it can engulf
corporate decision-making with multidimensional decisions with no clear
equilibrium, and it can exacerbate the agency problems of institutional investors.
Reasonable policy proposals to regulate stockholder politics should consider
both the potential benefits and costs of this phenomenon, by strengthening its
role as “check and balance” of managerial power and limiting its potential
distortions.

224. For a discussion of possible regulatory remedies to mitigate index fund agency problems, see John C.
Coates IV, John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, Testimony of Professor
John C. Coates IV Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United, States Senate:
“Considering the Index Fund Voting Process” (June 14, 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4142492.

